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NOMINATION OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JANUARY 6, 1981

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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WASHINGTON : 1981

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The committee met pursuant to notice at 10:00 a.m. in room 3001, between Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Tower, Chairman of the committee, presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower (presiding), Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Japan, Quayle, Denton, Stennis, Cannon, Byrd, Hart, Nunn and Levin.

Staff present: Robert E. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; James F. McInerney, general counsel; William L. Ball, chief clerk; Christian F. Conway, assistant chief clerk; Paul C. Bennett, counsel; Robert E. Dwyer, George H. Foster, Jr., Lewis E. Hays, Alan G. Hunt, Jr., Edward E. Keener, Donald F. Lehman, James R. Locher, Paul L. Lynch, Carl H. Smith, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Robert G. White, research assistant; Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; Judith P. Hunt; Elaine R. Ross; Ann E. Taylor, clerical assistants.

Also present: Christopher Lehman, assistant to Senator Warner; George Kuba, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Byrdette, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mike Donley, assistant to Senator Japan; Myrna Chomsky, assistant to Senator Quayle; Neil Beach, assistant to Senator Denton; Frank Gaffney, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armstrong, assistant to Senator Byrd; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Levin; and Peter Leitch, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Tower: Will the committee come to order?

We will recess about another 30 seconds for photographers to finish their work. We would prefer that the still photographers not take pictures during the course of the hearing because the flash bulbs are a distraction. It is my understanding that we will be covered today live by certain of the electronic media, in particular National Public Radio. If there were objection from any member of the committee, we will permit that coverage. If there is an objection, of course, then the question of that electronic coverage will be heard.

The meeting was welcomed by Mr. Caspar Weinberger who has been designated by President-elect Ronald Reagan as Secretary of Defense.

(3)

**NOMINATION OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1981

**U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.**

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 o'clock a.m., in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Tower (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower (presiding), Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, Denton, Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd, Hart, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel, James F. McGovern, general counsel, William L. Ball, chief clerk, Christine E. Cowart, assistant chief clerk, Paul C. Besozzi, counsel, Robert S. Dotson, George H. Foster, Jr., Louise R. Hoppe, Alton G. Keel, Jr., Edward B. Kenney, Ronald F. Lehman, James R. Locher, Don L. Lynch, Carl M. Smith, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members, Ralph O. White, research assistant, Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk, Judith P. Hunt, Elaine R. Rose, Ann E. Sauer, clerical assistants.

Also present: Christopher Lehman, assistant to Senator Warner; George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mike Donley, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Myrna Giesman, assistant to Senator Quayle; Ned Beech, assistant to Senator Denton; Frank Gaffney, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. Will the committee come to order?

We will permit about another 60 seconds for photographers to finish their work. We would prefer that the still photographers not take pictures during the course of the hearing because the flash bulbs are a distraction. It is my understanding that we will be covered today live by certain of the electronic media, in particular National Public Radio. If there is no objection from any member of the committee, we will permit that coverage. If there is an objection, of course, then the objection of that committee member will be honored.

This morning we welcome Mr. Caspar Weinberger who has been designated by President-elect Ronald Reagan as Secretary of Defense

in the new Republican administration which takes office January 20. President-elect Reagan has asked the Senate to act with all possible speed in considering this and other nominations in order that he can proceed promptly in assuming the reins of Government. As the newly elected chairman of this committee, I am confident our members will cooperate to the fullest extent possible in this proper and commendatory request.

Mr. Weinberger, we appreciate your cooperation in appearing so early in the year in order that we may expedite consideration of your prospective nomination. I welcome you on behalf of all the members of this committee. I sincerely believe that defense is a nonpartisan business, and while there may be differences of opinion, the goal of each of us is to provide a strong military establishment to insure the security of our Nation and promote peace throughout the world.

I would like to take particular note of two new committee members as we begin the first session of the 97th Congress. Our committee is most fortunate to have as new committee members Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana, and Senator Jeremiah Denton from Alabama. We welcome them to our membership, and I am confident they will make unique and valuable contributions during their service on the committee.

In carrying out our responsibilities we are fortunate that all the other Senators on the committee were members of this committee in the 96th Congress, and their experience will be of great benefit to the work that lies ahead. We should all afford special recognition today to the many years of invaluable service given to this committee, to the Senate, and to the American people by our former chairman, the distinguished senior Senator from Mississippi. We will all continue to rely heavily on his wisdom, his judgment, and the insights that he has brought to the committee over the years.

I want to publicly take this opportunity to thank Senator Stennis for the marvelous spirit of cooperation in which the transition has been made.

I want to thank him, too, for the splendid cooperation that he has shown to me throughout the years of my service on the committee, for his many kindnesses, and for his accommodating attitude, and I should also like to thank him for having been my mentor through these years and say that I know of no one in the Senate who has given more distinguished service to his State, his country, and the Senate than has John Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will respond to that later.

Chairman TOWER. Members of the committee, in order to expedite the business at hand, I do not intend to make any lengthy remarks except to say that I believe the significance and importance of the defense decisions to be made in the next 2 years cannot be overstated. I think it is fair to say that the burdens which will rest on the Secretary of Defense over the next 4 years will be as great as they have ever been. The future security of our country will be affected in countless ways by the exercise of his good judgment in making those many critical decisions that he will face while in office.

I think it necessary at this point to make some general comments concerning conflicts of interest. There are existing laws and regulations which require anyone selected for a responsible position in Government to disclose certain information concerning his or her personal financial situation.

In addition, the committee, as in the case of all nominees requiring Senate confirmation, will carefully examine Mr. Weinberger's financial situation as it relates to the committee's policies on potential conflicts of interest. Certain members of the committee staff have already met with Mr. Weinberger to discuss this matter. It is my understanding that we are awaiting the receipt of Mr. Weinberger's financial disclosure report and that we should have such information within the next few days. We will, of course, want to review thoroughly and, if necessary, discuss these matters with Mr. Weinberger before we take any financial action on his forthcoming nomination.

In closing, I will advise the committee that we will use the 10-minute rule in questioning the Secretary-designate.

I want to say at this point I have known Cap Weinberger for many years. He has been a dedicated and able public servant. He has performed well in every job that has been given him in public life. He has all the right instincts, and I look forward to the opportunity of working with him on the challenging tasks that face us over the course of this next Congress.

Before we proceed, I would like to call on our distinguished ranking member, Senator Stennis, for any comments that he may wish to make at this time.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly thank you for that courtesy, and I want to thank you, too, for your generous remarks that you made with reference to my tenure here and our service together. I can certainly return those compliments in totality to you and thank you, too, for your consideration made at all times during our service on this committee. We have seen many things together, and we value the services of each of the members on our committee above all else. Later, I would likely say a few words about my philosophy of the committee.

Let me say a word of warm welcome to the two new members of our committee. Gentlemen, it is a great privilege to serve on this committee. It has an illustrious history, and I am certain you will make a contribution. It is a wonderful opportunity for both of you.

I will ask Mr. Weinberger some questions at the proper time, Mr. Chairman. I had a very pleasant visit with him heretofore, and I feel I know him well. I welcome him, and thank him for what I believe he will do if he is confirmed, which doesn't seem to be in doubt. It is the biggest job in town, I think, next only to the Presidency of the United States.

I thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Stennis.

Before I recognize Mr. Weinberger, I would like to call on two of our distinguished colleagues who are seated at the table with him today.

First, the senior Senator from California, Senator Cranston.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN CRANSTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be here to introduce to you Caspar Weinberger, the nominee for Secretary of Defense.

I have known Caspar Weinberger for many, many years in California. He is a man of very high intelligence and of total integrity. He served with distinction in the State legislature. He was a very important figure in the administration of Governor Reagan in the State of California. He served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget in a prior administration here in Washington. He is an outstanding attorney and business leader in the State of California.

I think it is quite appropriate that a man with a reputation of being very tough on budgets—his nickname became Cap the Knife—is to be placed in charge of the agency that has such a very large budget, where there is sometimes the tendency, as there is on social problems, to throw money at problems. That will not occur under the administration of Caspar Weinberger. He will be very tight-fisted. While he will recognize that there have to be, as we all know, increases in national defense spending, he will do his utmost in a very intelligent, thoughtful way to insure that that money is well spent.

The only objection I have heard expressed to the nomination is that Caspar Weinberger lacks a strategic sense, lacks experience in national defense and foreign affairs matters. I would like to point out that as Director of the Office of Management and Budget, he had to familiarize himself with one of the largest components of that budget, the national defense budget, and in that time had considerable experience in this field.

Beyond that, while he may lack experience in the policy matters relating to national defense, and to our national security, I am absolutely confident that because of his very high intelligence he will soon have his own strategic sense and a very, very full understanding of the national defense policy issues that come before a Secretary of Defense.

And for these reasons and for many others I won't take the time to express, I wholeheartedly endorse his nomination to this very important post.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

We also have with us today Senator Hayakawa.
Senator?

**STATEMENT OF HON. S. I. HAYAKAWA, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Senator HAYAKAWA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Armed Services Committee.

Today I have the pleasure and honor of introducing the Honorable Caspar Willard Weinberger, Secretary of Defense-designate.

Cap Weinberger is no stranger in Washington. He has already distinguished himself in Government service. In 1968 Governor Reagan appointed him as California State Director of Finance. In October

1969 he was appointed to the Federal Trade Commission. As Chairman he carried out a reorganization that pointed the FTC toward serving consumer interests so effectively that he won praise from those not prone to lauding bureaucrats.

Then in 1972 he was appointed Director of the Office of Management and Budget where he served with distinction until he was appointed to head the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

After leaving the administration in 1975, he returned to California and became vice president and director of the Bechtel Corp., an international construction and engineering firm.

When Cap left HEW, he made a farewell speech about welfare and transfer payments and their effect on our economy. At that time I was writing a weekly newspaper column for the Register and Tribune Syndicate. I was so impressed by Mr. Weinberger's arguments that I devoted the next three columns to an explanation and examination of his theories. I don't think I devoted three columns to any other one single subject.

In the years I have known Caspar Weinberger, he has commanded my respect and admiration. Managing the Department of Defense is a monumental job, and there is no doubt in my mind that Cap is the man capable of handling that job. His background and experience will be a definite asset to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I think he will be able to fight against waste and mismanagement and make efficient use of our tax dollars so that our national security will not be compromised but strengthened.

I am very, very proud, then, to present the Honorable Caspar Weinberger.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Mr. Weinberger, I will insert your biographical sketch in the hearing record at this point.

[The biographical sketch follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

Weinberger, Caspar Willard—Vice President, Director and General Counsel of the Bechtel Group of Companies, born in San Francisco, California, August 18, 1917; son of Herman Weinberger and Cerise Carpenter Hampson Weinberger; married Jane Dalton, 1942; children: Caspar Willard Weinberger, Jr., and Mrs. Arlin Weinberger Paterak; attended public schools in San Francisco; graduated from Harvard College, A.B., 1938, magna cum laude; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1941; Phi Beta Kappa; awarded honorary degrees from the University of the Pacific, University of San Francisco, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Elmira College; served in Army 4 years, entering as private in infantry in 1941 and being discharged as captain in 1945; served over 3 years with the 41st Infantry Division in the Pacific and on General MacArthur's intelligence staff; law clerk to United States Circuit Judge William E. Orr, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1945-47; Instructor at Hastings Law School (University of California), and at Golden Gate Law School; in the private practice of law, 1947-69 with law firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, partner 1959-69.

Chairman, Republican State Central Committee of California, 1962-64; vice chairman, Republican State Central Committee of California, 1960-62; elected November 1952 to the Assembly of the California State Legislature from 21st District in San Francisco; reelected in 1954 and in 1956 without opposition; chairman, Assembly Committee on Government Organization, and chairman, Joint Assembly—Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholic Beverage Control; named as the most effective member of the Legislature in a poll of California newspaper correspondents in 1956; author of a semiweekly column on California State

Government running in numerous California newspapers; moderator of "Profile: Bay Area," KQED's (Channel 9, San Francisco) regular weekly local public affairs television program, 1959-68; formerly staff book reviewer for the San Francisco Chronicle and San Francisco magazine; chairman, Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy (Little Hoover Commission), 1967-68; appointed Director of Finance of California by Governor Reagan on February 1, 1968, effective March 1, 1968, and served until January 1, 1970.

Appointed by President Nixon to be Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission January 13, 1970; Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, July 2, 1970; Director of the Office of Management and Budget, June 12, 1972; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, February 12, 1973-August 8, 1975, resigned to enter private business; chairman of the President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1973-75; member of the Board of Governors of the American National Red Cross; member of Board of Trustees of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, 1973-75; Frank Nelson Doubleday (Smithsonian) lecturer in 1974.

Director of PepsiCo, New York; Director of Quaker Oats, Chicago; member of The Trilateral Commission; member of the Advisory Council of the American Ditchley Foundation; Treasurer of the Episcopal Diocese of California; and a member of the Board of Trustees of St. Luke's Hospital in San Francisco.

Appointed by Governor Brown and served as member of State Commission on Government Reform (post Prop. 13 problems), 1978-79; member of Joint State Legislative Audit Search Committee to appoint new State Auditor General, 1979; Chairman, 1980 Health Conference, Project Hope, Washington, D.C.

Chairman TOWER. We are delighted to recognize you now for any opening statement that you would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, NOMINEE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply grateful for the comments of my colleagues from California and hope very much that I will be able to live up to them.

I am deeply grateful, also, for your very kind remarks and the remarks of Senator Stennis and I appreciate greatly the very warm welcome that has been extended to me. Mr. Chairman, I have no formal opening statement.

I would say in response to one of your remarks that the financial disclosure statement has arrived in Washington from my accountants in San Francisco. It was filed with the transition ethics officer. It is my understanding that he transmits it to the Government ethics officer, and from there on you receive some sort of certification, and that process has been complete as far as I am concerned.

Otherwise I have no opening statement, and I am at your disposal, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Weinberger. We will proceed to questions.

I will reiterate that we will follow the 10-minute rule, and I ask all of my colleagues to please voluntarily stay within the 10-minute rule.

Mr. Weinberger, there has been press speculation that your appointment signals some change in the defense policy of the incoming administration. It has been suggested that perhaps your views on defense and defense spending are not compatible with those expressed by Governor Reagan during the course of the campaign, and that there might be some change in policy.

I would like to give you the opportunity to present your views on the commitment of Governor Reagan to national defense and what you consider your own role to be, and whether your views are compatible or incompatible with those expressed by Governor Reagan during the campaign.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I feel that there is full compatibility. I have talked to the Governor several times on the general subject over the years and very recently. I think there is complete agreement that it is absolutely essential that we first of all improve all aspects of the readiness of forces that we now have. Simultaneously—and it is hard to assign any priority between the two because I think they have to proceed simultaneously—we have to begin to improve the strategic balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union. I think there has been a gap opened, and I think that gap has to be closed, and I think that both of these goals would be undertaken with the general purpose of trying to deter—or have the goal of deterring—anyone from taking any action that would be harmful to our Nation or to its citizens.

And from my point of view, this involves everything from acts of terrorism and violence against our diplomats and our citizens up to and including possible attacks on the Nation itself.

I think only that if we have the forces and the weapons and only if we have the firmness and the resolution and the will to act when it is required, and perhaps even more important, only if it is perceived by others that we have these strengths, can we avoid the repeated actions that have been taken against our citizens, and other problems that we are all familiar with, that have been occurring too often in recent years.

As long as we are perceived by any potential enemy or by our allies, for that matter, to be ill-equipped or weak or irresolute or guilt ridden, or unwilling or unable to do anything except be patient, then I think we can expect perhaps increasingly hostile actions against our people abroad, and to my mind, actions that would weaken our position in the world. And we have seen a lot of these in Afghanistan and Angola and Iran and elsewhere.

I spoke of readiness, and I think that is a general term, but what I mean by readiness encompasses a very large number of things. We have forces in being. I think many of them are understrength. I think we have not had the fuel or the ammunition for full training. Certainly the compensation of the uniformed services has to be improved. I think we have to bring these existing units up to strength in performance, equipment and training, and I think that this would also require this general aspect of improving readiness—that we as the American people again try—and this would be one of the very highest priorities that I would like to work on—to regain the respect and the honor and the appreciation that I think we should all feel for people in the uniformed services.

This used to be the feeling of the country. I would very much like to see it again, and I would like to make this a very high priority of what I would propose to do in the next few years. Our people in uniform are not militarists seeking glory abroad in a lot of bold or disastrous adventures, but they are shouldering, really, the burdens that enable us to continue to live in peace and freedom, and I think we should honor them for it.

As far as improving that strategic balance that I mentioned as a sort of simultaneous priority, not a second one but a simultaneous priority, I think that involves starting and continuing various weapons systems that will give us sufficient strength so that anyone who plans any sort of an attack will correctly perceive that we retain such a full ability to respond, to deliver a return blow of such strength that they will be deterred from launching that kind of an attack.

This requires that we conduct a very consistent policy of increasing our strengths, and that we conduct ourselves and our relations with all of our friends in such a way that they will believe in and that they will join us to the utmost of their ability in securing the basic goal in which we all have an equal interest. And that, of course, is the maintenance of peace and freedom for us all. Those will be the priorities, or the philosophy, if you like, with which I would approach this task if I should be confirmed.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberger. I am delighted to note that your perception of priorities is very, very compatible with my own. I am particularly delighted that you recognize the necessity of addressing our manpower and personnel problems immediately in that they do impact rather seriously on our state of readiness. I am delighted to see that you are prepared to address that problem at the outset.

Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, I have already said that I think that next to the presidency itself, that this is the most powerful position in the Government—the one that you propose to fill—and the most essential, of course, so far as national security is concerned. For my part, I intend to back you up in this service in every way that I can.

By all means, I know that you are subject to the policy of Governor Reagan who was elected President of the United States. I am going to urge you on some things from time to time that I think ought to be done within that pattern.

Let me reflect just a moment here, for the interest of the public. Twelve years ago we had a gentleman before this committee, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, and he was questioned with regard to his financial background. He had several hundred million dollars, and this committee went a long ways in setting up a special order under which he could operate without having to give up all of that stock, which would have flooded the market. I mention this not in credit to him but to the public.

Think of what has happened in the last 12 years. That money was put in escrow and put aside by him—scrupulously followed by his proposal, carried out in every way. Profits in the meantime went to public purposes. Nothing has ever been said, nothing was found, and nothing has been said since to show the least infraction by him or anyone connected with him with reference to that enormous holding and the carrying out of his duties. He was a good man in every way.

I mention that just as an assurance to the public. I feel like we have the same type man with us this morning, frankly, from what I have learned. I don't think there is anything more important than that, Mr. Weinberger—the confidence of the people—the confidence of

the people in you, in us, and in everyone that is trying to administer their affairs. It is something they must have. I am willing to pass on you on what you say about your situation, of course.

Now let me mention, I think one of the big things you can cope with with some success and change it for the better is the question of procurement. These large sums of money, billions and billions of dollars, the matter of making every dollar go as far as it will, that is one of the things that built America. People had an inherent knowledge of stretching a dollar, making it go as far as it possibly could, making its value return, and that is not easy, particularly now.

And I hope that you can give the people, the taxpayers—and we have millions of so-called little people, paying taxes until they hurt—some assurance from you in this powerful position that you are going to give this question of procurement personal attention, and try to get some results in that end, which I believe would be very timely, very helpful and reassuring to those of us on the committee.

Now, another thing I want to mention—and I am certainly not an expert on this subject, but I feel I know a little bit about human nature, and I have followed this manpower problem in the military mighty closely. Without wanting to espouse the cause of the Selective Service Act this morning, I do want to point out that I believe you will find the problem glaring in your face. You are on a talent hunt, as I see it. You have to have more capabilities, and I am referring not only to brain power but raw courage and other things—I don't believe we can buy it at the crossroads or the street corners. We need a greater number of our youths brought into the service who have those qualities I have mentioned to give the military a chance to pick from them and put them in these key places—more than the military now has of that type.

It is a great honor to wear the American uniform. I don't cast any reflections on anyone who is in the service now, but the capability of every person is limited to some degree.

I hope you will go out on this talent hunt in what is the best way to get it. I am not wanting you to go against the President of the United States, of course, but you are going to be the man to do something about it.

I have said we will never get a Selective Service Act back on the books, I don't believe, until the chief executive, whoever he is, sees fit to take the lead in it. Until then, the people are not conscious of the need. So, I hope you will approach it in the spirit in which I mentioned it.

I do feel free on your assurances to talk to you about the subject later.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Stennis.

I might note that various members of the committee have other committee conflicts this morning, and they have to wander in and out. I hope you will understand that this is no discourtesy to you, Mr. Weinberger, but we have some committee chairmen in here, and some ranking members that have other committee responsibilities.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have known Mr. Weinberger for many, many years. We have worked together, and I will have no difficulty supporting him at all.

But if you were to ask me what bothers me more than anything else in our defense setup, it is the subject of personnel, and I think this problem is far, far more dangerous to our military future than we have been told or than we realize. We cannot man all the ships we have because we are short enlisted men. We are short enlisted men in all services, particularly in the ranks of sergeant and above. We are short 2,500 pilots, and we talk about going on possible maneuvers against an enemy. When you are short 2,500 pilots, that is a great handicap to start off with.

Mr. Weinberger, I hope you will give particular attention to this problem of personnel. Our military men need more pay, they need more benefits, they need more attention. One thing that has particularly bothered me for many, many years is the practice of allowing—well, not allowing but forcing young enlisted men, some of whom haven't reached the age of 40 or some who are in their 40's to get out of the service. Frankly, I would like to see the Defense Department do away with forced retirement in all enlisted and officer ranks. As I have often said, I would rather have a 60-year-old sergeant taking care of my jet engine than some 20-year-old boy. I know that these older enlisted men are not particularly interested in more money; they just like the work, and they want to stay on.

So I merely mention these things to you, Mr. Weinberger, as one who has spent a good part of his life in the military and who realizes, I think, as all people do who have ever served, that you don't win wars with weapons, you win wars with people.

And I welcome you to this disastrous city.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, Senator.

[General laughter.]

Mr. WEINBERGER. I fully agree, and of course I have to say that with the approaching years, the advantages of 60-year-old people are becoming more and more apparent to me every day. But I do think that you and Senator Stennis have both put your finger on an extremely important need for the Department, and I do feel that not only improved compensation but surely improved benefits of all types are important because the retention is an extremely important factor. It takes a long time and a lot of effort to train people, particularly now in these complex systems that we have, and to lose them too quickly, certainly before they are ready to go, or sometimes because they cannot afford to stay, is a great waste.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. I want to join my colleagues in congratulating you or commiserating with you, Mr. Weinberger, in this new undertaking.

Obviously we have a lot of problems with our defense posture; in readiness, which means, among other things, our military personnel. We also have deficiencies in our general purpose forces, and in our strategic forces.

Do you have any preliminary estimates as to what the budget is going to look like at this point?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, sir, I have not seen the 1982 budget yet. The 1982 budget speculation has been published, but I have not seen the actual budget. I know that the President-elect plans to take the entire 1982 budget and have it examined carefully and make a series of recommendations to the appropriate committees, and I would be carrying out that task before this committee. And I know that he hopes to do that as soon as possible. But I have not seen the 1982 budget yet, and I think it will not be released until next week, I believe.

Senator JACKSON. But you do see substantial increases?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, yes, I do.

Senator JACKSON. In the Defense budget.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. After working over the fat, so to speak—and as mentioned earlier, you have a certain reputation in that area—that will mean, would you say, a leaner yet larger Defense budget?

Mr. WEINBERGER. My preliminary impression, Senator, is that in any organization that has \$160 billion, there has to be some opportunity for savings. I would want to try to find those, and obviously savings that certainly do not affect in any way the effectiveness of our forces or the strength of our forces. And if there are such to be found, then I would want to utilize them for the purpose of increasing the net gain in our strength.

I think we need more firepower, and I think we can achieve that. We will have to have it. There will be some budget increases clearly necessary. To the extent that we can identify some things that are not essential to that, then those would count as a net against it, so to speak, and would increase the effective dollars that could be spent.

But I don't have any doubt that there are increases needed. As a matter of fact, it is my understanding that there has to be a supplemental because the pay increase of last fall, which was certainly much needed, is not as yet fully funded.

Senator JACKSON. You have not yet come to any definitive position at this point regarding military compensation and how we can provide for better quality in the Armed Forces?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Not a definitive conclusion. I fully agree with the need—that the various benefits and compensations of all kinds do need improvement, that we need to have an inducement to people to stay, and I think that there are a number of things that can be done.

I think that one of the things we would certainly want to do would be to re-examine the pay scales on some sort of comparability basis, and also the various advantages and benefits that have from time to time been offered to the military.

There are a number of other things that I have examined, and one or two would be very attractive to people whom we do need to retain. But that certainly is a very high priority because I conceive that to be a very big part of this readiness, which I think is one of the major priorities, as I said.

Senator JACKSON. Now, one of the things that will determine the kind of budget that you have over the future years, of course, is the kind of strategic arms agreement under which we will operate in the future. This is something that the committee has gone into in a sub-

stantial way because it directly affects the budget structure of the Department of Defense, and of course, the strategic plan that we are to follow to provide for the national defense.

I wonder, have you had a chance to read our report on the military implications of the SALT II Treaty?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes I have, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. What is your reaction?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I have no disagreement with it whatever. I agree with the conclusions and I think it is an extremely well done report. I think it sums up, really, in a very able fashion, the concerns that I had at the time the SALT II agreement was being discussed.

Senator JACKSON. I appreciate having your comment on that because I think the action taken by our committee, in adopting our SALT II report by a 10 to nothing vote was highly important. There were separate views expressed in addition, as you know, but we did address the fundamental issues of equality and verification and so on.

I won't go into that at this time, but I would like to express a strong view that you and the Department of Defense be involved early on in connection with negotiations that may or may not take place for a modified or a changed SALT agreement.

Do you share that?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes. My personal view is, Senator, that negotiations should continue, and that we should make every effort to get a vastly better agreement than SALT II. My understanding is that the Department of Defense and the Secretary of Defense would be very intimately involved in that entire process, and I think they have to be.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Weinberger, I have had the privilege of working with you for almost a decade now.

Mr. WEINBERGER. That's right.

Senator WARNER. And I fully appreciate, along with my colleagues, the personal and family sacrifice that you are making to return to the service of the country.

As a follow-on to Senator Jackson's question, we will be working with you in the important area of restoring the margin of safety in our strategic warfare balance.

What is the framework, the general framework between the Soviet Union and the United States that you think would enable us to once again resume meaningful negotiations toward arms control?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I have to believe that both sides would certainly want to have such discussions continue. I don't think that we should enter into such negotiations from a position of weakness or a position which contemplates maintenance of the kind of gap that now exists.

So I think that negotiations, to be useful to both sides, have to be viewed from a different kind of basis, that is, the basis that we both want peace—we would assume that—and that we both believe, or certainly I would believe, that we have the best chance of obtaining peace if there is not such a destabilizing factor as a gross imbalance in the forces of the two countries. I think it should be clearly under-

stood that while we would want to enter into negotiations and continue negotiations as long as they are meaningful, it would have to be with the result of trying to produce the kind of agreement that left no question in anyone's mind that a sufficient deterrent was present so that anyone would be totally discouraged from launching an attack.

Senator WARNER. The President and the Nation have now committed to building up our defenses, but in doing so, we devote dollars, skill, raw material, and indeed, much of the industrial base at a time when our economy is in a precarious state.

What would be your hoped for time frame within which you can begin to restore this margin of safety, and do it in a fashion to minimize the risk of waste? And I personally think, having been on that side of the table, that the risk of waste in a buildup period is high.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I agree, and I don't think we can afford it because we do have an economy that is, at the very least, sorely troubled. Certainly the inflation is one of the most weakening, debilitating factors that an economy can have, and as we all know, a very large portion of that is brought on by Government total overspending.

I think we are certainly looking at the need for improving our balance as quickly as possible, and that is one of the reasons why I emphasized readiness. I think we have to bring to full readiness the forces that we now have. I would hope that we would be able to do this within a short number of years, and I think we could do it only if we are conscious of the fact that, exactly as you said, the temptation is just to spend anything that is suggested or requested or even thought about in the hopes that that will do it more rapidly.

That has not been my experience. I think you can get a far more effective result if the great bulk of the dollars that are available—and they are not unlimited—are applied to the most effective things. The common expression, the one I use, is an increase in firepower, meaning the whole broad spectrum of our ability. There are bound to be some expenditures now going on that do not contribute directly to that. It would be my desire to try to identify those, and where we were very clear that they were of that category, try to substitute for them expenditures on an increased scale that would improve the whole strategic balance as well as bring our forces to readiness.

And I would not want to make a prediction as to how soon it could be done, but I think it is a very urgent priority for the Nation, and I would apply that feeling to it.

Senator WARNER. One last question.

During my brief period here in the Senate, I have been increasingly concerned about the transfer of technology from this Nation to the Soviet Union, and I am hopeful that you as Secretary of Defense, and your Department, will take a more active role in overseeing the types of technology that this Nation may in the future be inclined to supply to the Soviet Union.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Oh, I would agree with that. Part of the problem is that some years ago there were one or two, what we might call involuntary transfers of technology, and there have been, I think, some instances, and certainly some possibilities, where in an apparently un-

related field civilian computers or things of that kind, requests have been made and perhaps granted that have advanced their capabilities in a way that was not necessary for us to do.

I think it is a major part of the defense effort, again going back to this need to improve the strategic balance, to have this in mind at all times, and I would feel confident that the Department's views would be received through the Government and received particularly by any agency that had any authority to grant licenses or anything of that kind.

Senator WARNER. I judge you then agree that the Department should take a stronger role.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes; I do.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Byrd of Virginia.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, when you were last in Government under previous administrations, in a Cabinet position as Director of the Office of Management and Budget, we had an opportunity to work together on a number of matters. You testified with great frequency before the Senate Committee on Finance. I was much impressed with your ability. I am delighted to support your confirmation as Secretary of Defense, a vitally important position.

Since you have been nominated, we have had the opportunity to talk together several times, so I have no questions, or maybe one or two.

Just let me ask you about this.

How do you feel about uniformed military officers speaking out and presenting their own views?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think the basic feeling I have, Senator, is first of all we need all the help we can get. Uniformed military officers are specialists in most cases, experts in many cases, and their views are important to seek and to be presented fully and freely. I do think that in the kind of government we have, with civilian control of these matters, that, after a basic policy decision has been reached on the basis of a full, fair and free presentation, the course that has to be followed is support of that policy, if there is disagreement with it, disassociation through resignation or otherwise is a viable course. But certainly, the opportunity should be presented in appropriate settings for uniformed military people who are expert in their fields to give the Government the benefit of those views.

Senator BYRD. Would I be correct in assuming that you would expect and would understand that both your military subordinates and your civilian subordinates, when they come before this committee and are asked questions, even though their reply might be contrary to established policy, you would recognize their right to speak frankly to this committee, not necessarily to initiate their views, but to speak frankly in responding to questions of a military nature, even though their views on that particular question might differ from that of the Defense Department?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. I feel that this committee and this body is part of the policymaking process, obviously, and I would think that it is essential that you be given, the gentlemen on this committee be

given, the benefits of the same kind of expert testimony and expert opinion that we have in the Department. I would think that there does come a time when the policy is determined, and at that time speaking out contrary to it causes confusion and division. But I think that in the process of forming the policy it is essential that fair, frank and honest testimony, expert testimony, be available, and I think that that would involve presentation of all sides of the subject.

There may be occasions when executive sessions of the committee would be desirable, but basically I would think these would be the principles that I would want to follow.

Senator BYRD. You mentioned prior to policy being formulated. I would assume that even though policy has been formulated, if an officer of your Department comes before this committee, even though the policy has been formulated, you would expect and I think the committee would certainly expect, it has in the past, that officer to speak frankly in responding to questions.

Mr. WEINBERGER. That's what I tried to say, Senator. I indicated that I thought the committee and the Congress are obviously heavily involved in the policy-forming process, and that as part of that formation of policy, you would expect and I would expect that full and free testimony would be given. If there are some differences apparent, why then I would hope that the logic of the case, we'll say in a hypothetical situation, of the Department would persuade the committee.

And once the decision is finally taken, I would then expect that it would be supported. When I say finally taken, I mean by the Congress as well as by the Department.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, even though you were introduced by two Californians, I know that your heart really resides in Maine where you stay in the summertime. I welcome you.

Mr. WEINBERGER. It is a very beautiful part of the country.

Senator COHEN. Not at this time of year where it is 35 below zero. [General laughter.]

Senator COHEN. You mentioned that we should not enter negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT II from a position of weakness. That suggests to me, at least, a question of timing. I raise that because there is an item that appeared in the Washington Star several weeks ago in which it indicated there is some disagreement within the Reagan administration—the transition team, at least—as to when those negotiations should begin. There are some who are advocating that they should be resumed almost immediately following the inauguration. There are others who would urge a 6-month delay so that key defense decisions could be taken.

I was wondering what your view on that is.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I haven't any fully formed views as to the timeliness. Negotiations, of course, require two parties, and we would have to have some agreement as to the appropriate time, and I am not aware of any overtures or any discussions that have been initiated by the Soviets,

I would think it is very desirable from a number of points of view—general things that are going to happen in the next few months, appropriations bills, and authorization bills coming up very soon—for us to have an opportunity to examine this whole matter from the point of view of being a Government as opposed to a transition.

I would think that it would take a good 6 months for some formulations of policies to be made. I don't think we should enter the negotiations lightly or unadvisedly, and I think that we should have a very clear idea of the agenda that we would want to pursue, and the goals, the way in which we would like to have it come out. And I think that will take a few months.

But aside from getting our own side in order, getting our own agenda made up, then I don't think there is any particular problem about timing, and I think it is important that the process continue.

Senator COHEN. In other words, what you are suggesting is that before we move into any serious stage of negotiations, this administration should have an opportunity to formulate what, in fact, is going to be its overall defense policy.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator COHEN. You need to look at certain programs; for example, the MX, whether it should be accelerated, the cruise missile acceleration, whether we should have the follow-on to a penetrating bomber. Most of those would have to be formulated certainly in your mind and that of the administration, before you would move forward in any serious stage of considering negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes. Without undue modesty, I would like to phrase it just very simply and say I would like to know a great deal more about it before we got into a negotiation of that importance.

Senator COHEN. There was also an item in today's New York Times concerning the West German Social Democratic Party. A spokesman for the SDP indicated that unless the Senate ratified SALT II, West Germany would have to reconsider its decision to modernize its theater nuclear forces.

Do you think that should be a consideration of this administration?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, and I would hope it would not correctly represent the view of any government. As I understand it, the SALT II treaty is no longer on the Senate calendar having been returned to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. I do not believe that the new President will request the Senate to give its advice and consent to the SALT II treaty in its present form.

Senator COHEN. On draft registration, I did not support the President's initiation of draft registration at the time. I felt it was the wrong response to the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, concluding that it was much more important that we deal with the issue of retention—and we have heard that word used here today about our personnel. In fact, outgoing Secretary of Defense Brown has indicated that one of the biggest failures of the Defense Department, or his failure at least, was that he didn't act quickly enough to prevent the exodus of thousands of experienced, highly skilled personnel.

But while I opposed the institution of peacetime draft registration, the fact is that it has been imposed. My own position would be that it ought to be continued, even though I initially opposed it. I think it

would be inconsistent, to say the least—it would send the wrong kind of signal, to change policies once they have been implemented. I was wondering what your position might be on draft registration.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I have not had an opportunity to discuss that directly with the President-elect. I am aware that there would be at the very least severe administrative problems in rolling back a registration that is presently underway right at this time. I believe it was just earlier this week that actions were called upon by people of certain age.

I think, basically, what I would like to do would be to see if some of the improved inducements to remain in the service, some of the improved inducements for retaining people after they have been trained, and encouraging them to enter through the Voluntary Armed Force idea, would not work a little better, and I would like to give that a little longer trial to see if that could not produce the type and the numbers of manpower that Senator Stennis and Senator Goldwater and others have referred to this morning.

I certainly wouldn't want to pursue that beyond the point where it became clear that it was not working, but I obviously would like to avoid a draft in peacetime with all of the things that it entails, just as long as possible.

And I guess the short of it is that I just would like to see if the Voluntary Armed Force with the improved benefits that we are hoping to put in wouldn't work to produce what we need.

Senator COHEN. Well, in that light, in terms of needed inducements, the Army has indicated that the No. 1 legislative goal for 1981 is the reinstatement of the GI bill. I know that President-elect Reagan has called for its reinstatement, and I have supported it since November of 1979.

Would you be willing to consider the reinstitution?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, I certainly would be willing to consider that. In World War II, with which I had some familiarity, it was not an inducement to enter, but it certainly was a very valuable benefit for people who had served, and I think it would be correctly viewed in that light, and that is, one of the items we do have on the list of improved benefits.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Weinberger, during the course of the campaign there was some confusion in terms of the United States gaining superiority over the Soviet Union or achieving parity and being second to no power. At one time we had an overwhelming superiority in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. This provided the so-called nuclear umbrella to our Western European and Japanese allies. That lead has gone. Whether we have followed a policy—a deliberate policy of parity some would argue—I think with some credibility we can say that we have followed it to a point where we have slipped into a state of inferiority.

But there is one area that we have had a margin—I believe Senator Warner mentioned this—of superiority. That is in the field of naval superiority. Our CNO has testified on several occasions before this committee that we are losing that thin margin of superiority as well. I was wondering what you would have in mind for the shipbuilding program or our sea power, and our ability to project force to various parts of the globe.

Mr. WEINBERGER. One of the elements of both the improvement of our strategic balance and improving our present state of readiness that I have in mind would be an increase in naval strength. We have a basic goal of a 600-ship Navy. We are well under that, and I think that it is essential for the missions that we have to perform that the naval strength be increased. It is still vital to the Nation's security, I believe, that control of the sea and availability of the sea, freedom of the sea for American forces, be maintained, and I think that will require more naval strength than we have now.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Weinberger, there has been reference made today to some apprehension on the part of some people that perhaps you are going to wield too sharp a knife. Frankly, I think there are areas within the defense budget, as there are in all budgets, where we would welcome your careful and scrupulous review of programs. I can tell you of the concerns Senator Jackson and I have had as members of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Jackson conducted hearings on the technology transfer issue. Senator Levin and I had hearings on so-called hurry-up spending, the policy whereby Government agencies unload a very large segment of their budget in the final weeks of the fiscal year, and we found that to be true within the Defense Department itself. In fact, the Army Audit Agency uncovered a number of instances in which there was a tremendous waste of taxpayer dollars.

So I would think that a lot of people within the Congress, as well as within the country, are going to welcome your scrupulous review of practices such as sole-source contracts and other noncompetitive procurement practices which have resulted in the waste of millions of dollars to this country. We welcome that aspect.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I don't think anyone would want any ineffective spending in this area or in any other, and that reputation you referred to is largely a myth. We were never able to cut the budgets as far as I thought we should.

Chairman TOWER. Senator EXON?

Mr. EXON. Mr. Weinberger, I am very delighted that the President-elect has selected you as Secretary of Defense, and I echo the sentiments expressed by the chairman and the former chairman with regard to the importance of the office for which you will be confirmed in the Senate. I ask these questions, therefore, recognizing that you have not had an opportunity to address the many important issues which you are going to face.

But assuming that you are going to be confirmed, I hope that you can be as responsive as possible to some of the questions that I intend to put to you at this time.

In the first place, you have a reputation of surrounding yourself with excellent people so far as qualifications and expertise are concerned.

What will be your recommendation to the President-elect with regard to retaining General Jones until the end of his term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, which expires next year, and who do you intend to bring in as Under Secretary of Defense, replacing Mr. Perry, for Engineering and Research?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I am not at this point prepared to give a formal recommendation on General Jones. I know and like him personally. I think there are a number of factors. It is a Presidential decision, as is the appointment of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering. It has always been my practice in the past to leave Presidential appointments up to the Presidents, but we will certainly have some recommendations on the latter position, and I would try, as you have suggested, to get the very best people available. We are obviously in discussion with a number of people whose reputations and previous records would indicate they would be able to fulfill that position very well, and I would certainly try to get someone who I felt was able to add strength to the Department. I think this is an extremely important function that calls for a very high-caliber person.

I am not at this point ready, but I certainly would want to discuss the matter with the committee as we got closer to a recommendation stage.

Senator EXON. Mr. Weinberger, one of the early decisions that I suspect that you are going to have to make is to whether or not to go ahead with the proposed CX aircraft that the Carter administration has recommended. There are some of us who have reservations about that, especially the questions as to whether or not the very expensive C-5 aircraft, which I am sure you have dealt with in your past experience in the executive branch, can do the job.

Do you have any thoughts now as to whether or not the recent tests that are in or not in on the C-5 would indicate that it might fulfill the role basically, and we might not have to go ahead with the expensive CX aircraft?

Mr. WEINBERGER. There are not any fully formed views yet, Senator. I am familiar with one of the basic advantages that has been urged for the CX, and that, of course, is its ability to get equipment, heavy equipment, much closer to the tactical areas where needed, that it can land on much shorter airfields and softer airfields and things of that kind.

I haven't seen all the tests on the C-5A, and I would want to examine those very carefully. If we have a plane that can do the job, it is obviously much more effective in every way to modify or to continue to use that plane rather than develop a whole new system. And incidentally, at this point I would like to say that Senator Stennis' remarks about procurement strike a very close chord in my thinking because I do think that the procurement process is both very expensive and very long. And that would be a factor in considering whether the CX development should go ahead, what stage it is in and all.

But mainly I would form a decision based on an examination of the various missions for which it would seem to be required, and there is an attractive feature of it, of which I am aware, that it would be able to get in much closer to a tactical situation, and thereby be more effective in conventional warfare types of situations.

Senator EXON. There has been much discussion evidently fostered by the transition team with regard to the possibility of deploying early the MX missile in present Minuteman silos. This has many ramifications, I suspect not the least of which is the discussion now in

progress on whether or not, because of environmental reasons and others, we should not locate the MX missile, in whatever form it takes, on land now owned by the United States in some of our desert areas.

My question is, are you attuned or receptive to the idea of expanding the present Minuteman silos, and in their locations, connect them supposedly with the grandiose plan of superhighways, taking a great deal of very productive farmland out of what it does best, to produce food, which there is going to be a shortage of in the world in the immediate future? Are you at all interested in the proposition of trying to put MX in Minuteman silos now? If so, what justification is there for that proposition when the main concern of most of us today is that we have sitting targets which are well known to the Soviet Union, and would not simply placing the MX in Minuteman silos just give the Soviet Union a chance to destroy a vehicle that has 10 warheads on it rather than 1 or 3?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, it is a very good, a very penetrating question.

The MX is a stronger missile, and as you just mentioned, has a much greater capability with the additional warheads, and is a missile which I think would be a very useful addition to our arsenal. I think it needs a mobile or a protected form of storage because again, as you said, I think the Soviets are well aware of a number of the existing missile locations. Indeed, that is one of the worries about the land-based missile system.

I would want to examine a wide number of options as to ways in which the MX, once fully operational, could be deployed. I would want to examine ways in which we might deploy it and launch it from a number of different possibilities, protected sites or otherwise.

There is no question that some of the plans that have been discussed do involve the use of a very substantial amount of very valuable and useful real estate. It is probable that after the installation they would be able to recover much of the use of this land, but it would be a very large and a very intrusive undertaking certainly at the beginning.

On the other hand, the need for a strengthened missile, the need for some kind of more protected, less well-known site is clearly there.

Within those parameters, I think there are a number of alternatives that I would like to look at. I would feel that simply putting it into the existing silos would not answer two or three of the concerns that I have; namely, that these are well known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be, to be of sufficient strategic value to count as a strategic improvement of our forces.

I do think we need the strengthened missile. I do think that we need to examine very carefully, and I might add very quickly, the ways in which we could protect and make it usable with the high degree of accuracy that is required, and certainly I would want to examine all the different suggestions that have already been made, along with some others.

Senator EXON. My last question, Mr. Chairman, has to do with our allies and defense spending.

Certainly this committee and this Congress, and I am sure the next one, will be providing more and more money for the defense needs of this Nation and the free world. But when we start talking about the

free world, there is this ongoing concern which many of us have with regard to the fact that the Japanese, for example, are spending less than 1 percent of their GNP on defense. Our NATO allies, for the most part, are far below their percentage of spending on the GNP.

Now, if we are going to go into this necessary military buildup, what thoughts or ideas do you have to encourage or insist, if you want to use that word, that our allies carry a heavier share of this burden also?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I think they should. I think that for the most part they want to. I think there are a number of different ways of going about trying to persuade them or to encourage them to do so. In the first place, I have to say I think that if we had a more consistent foreign policy, if we were viewed as a more reliable ally and an ally who did indeed have the resolution and the will to proceed along this path that you indicate we are going to take and that I agree we should take, then I think we might have a more immediate and favorable response.

I would certainly keep pressing in a number of ways in all of the meetings that I would expect to have with counterparts in other governments, friendly governments, the importance of this and the fact that no one country can do it alone, and that it is not only not financially feasible, but it is far more desirable from a military point of view if there is a substantial commitment by a large number of people to this same enterprise which we all share.

I do feel that there has been an uncertainty about America's course and a concern that the policy has moved back and forth somewhat more rapidly and perhaps with less advance consultation than could have been the case. And for that reason I think that one of the ways we would hope to bring about this result, which I fully agree we should try to bring about, would be to try to demonstrate that we had a consistent policy, that we were basically a very reliable and a very strong and a very useful ally, and that in order to increase that strength and usefulness, we needed major contributions from those countries that are basically joined by philosophy and by belief in space and freedom.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Weinberger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you here. I want to join the chairman and my distinguished colleagues in welcoming you to our proceeding this morning. As this new Congress convenes, national security is the most important issue facing our Nation. The new administration which will take office on inauguration day and in which you will play a vital role was elected by an overwhelming mandate from the American people on a platform which called for military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Speaking at the polls, our people have approved and endorsed a national strategy of peace through unquestioned strength.

It is the privilege of the President-elect to select individuals of his choice to serve as members of his Cabinet. I am familiar with your record of past performance in Federal and State government and know particularly of your record as an accomplished manager. I am sure you

will also prove to be a fast learner when it comes to matters concerning our common defense.

You may be assured of my personal support and cooperation as we work together to rebuild and maintain a strong national security. We look forward to hearing your views on a number of key issues.

I just want to say that I knew you when you were at the Budget Bureau and I knew you in HEW. I think you did a magnificent job, and it will be a pleasure for me to vote for your confirmation.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to add my voice to those welcoming Mr. Weinberger.

I have a number of questions, many of them relating to comments which have been made over recent years, about our state of readiness, and our strength.

About a year ago President Carter said that we were going to defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf with whatever force is necessary, if force be necessary. In the ensuing year since that state of the Union address, the ability to carry out that commitment has been challenged, in terms of whether we have the military horsepower to carry it out.

Do we have the military power to carry out that commitment to defend the Persian Gulf, in your opinion?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I don't believe we have at this point; no, Senator. I think we have to develop that very quickly. I think that is part of the readiness that I had in mind, but I think that can and should be done, and I think there are some things we can do now. I think we have started on doing some things with the deployment of the AWACS plane. But I feel we have to do better.

Senator LEVIN. If you don't have the power to carry out that commitment now, do you expect that President-elect Reagan will then not renew the commitment to protect our vital interests in the Persian Gulf with whatever force is necessary?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think that our commitment to do whatever is desired of us by the occupants of those countries and those regions is going to be a very high priority. I think we will need a military presence there if the countries involved concur and invite us. I think that it is enormously important to the future of the United States as well as to many of those countries, and I think we should get ourselves in a position as quickly as possible to carry out commitments of that kind.

Senator LEVIN. Do you expect that President-elect Reagan will renew the commitment to use whatever force is necessary in the Persian Gulf to protect our vital interests there?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I don't know what he would do in that connection, and I certainly would not want to speak for him. My strong impression is that he shares the view that there is a vital importance of that region to the United States and to the countries there involved, and that the Arabian Gulf is a very vital part of the delivery system of the oil which the free world needs and which the producers of that oil need to sell, and I would think that he would certainly want, with their concurrence and at their invitation to do whatever is necessary

to help preserve the freedom of the seas and the freedom of opportunity and so forth in that area, yes.

Senator LEVIN. Having just returned from the Persian Gulf, having met with the leaders there, and having just returned from the Middle East, where I have met with everyone from King Hussein, of Jordan, to President Sadat, of Egypt, Prime Minister Begin, of Israel, President Sarkys, of Lebanon, military leaders in Saudi Arabia and Oman, I can conclude these leaders don't agree on a whole lot of things, but one thing they do agree on is that it is vital that the United States have a presence in the Persian Gulf and keep its commitment and renew its commitment to use whatever force is necessary to protect those vital interests—

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, with the concurrence of those countries, I would think that would ultimately have to be done, and I would hope that we would be in a better position to do it than I fear we are now.

Senator LEVIN. My question is this: Because of the statements that have been made since the last state of the Union message about our ability to carry out that commitment, a cloud has been raised over it.

The question is whether or not the President-elect will renew that commitment to protect our vital interests? I would hope that you as the Secretary of Defense would raise that question as promptly as possible with the President-elect because it is critical to our allies in the Middle East that that commitment be renewed.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I am not aware of any suggestion that there would be any challenge made to it. I think the only concern is the ability to carry it out with the vigor and the force and strength that may be required. But I am not aware of any suggestion that there would be any weakening of that as a basic policy, but I do think there are a number of ways in which the commitment has to be given, and I think that the concurrence of the countries involved is a vital part of that. They are their country, and we all have a vital interest in the area. I think that is fully recognized. I agree with the assessment you have just given of the leaders. But I do think that that is a very important aspect to it.

Another important aspect to it is improving our capability of effecting that commitment. But I am not aware of any slight suggestion that there is any lessening of the view that that is a very vital part of America's future.

Senator LEVIN. Then you would expect the President-elect to renew that commitment?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I am not going to ever speak for him, but I am certainly going to indicate my own views to him, and I am not aware of any contrary views that he or anyone else has in that connection.

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated that the Russians have opened up a rather big and serious military lead over us, "a real gap," in your words, unlike the fictitious 1960 missile gap.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Unlike the 1960 gap, right.

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated this morning that until that real gap is closed and we can negotiate from strength, as you put it, that arms control discussions are not going to be fruitful.

How long is that going to take in your opinion?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I have left you with a misimpression. It is not until that gap is closed, but until we have very firmly signalled and indicated a beginning of a major effort to close that gap. I don't think that we have to sit on the sidelines and not allow the negotiating process to proceed, but I do think that there has to be a very clear indication that we are aware of the gap and we are aware of the importance of improving the balance markedly and materially, and I think during that period of time, if that signal is clearly and unequivocally given, as I assume it will be, that it then would be possible to enter into negotiations.

But it has been my experience on negotiations of a far less vital scale that very little is accomplished by entering negotiations from a position of weakness.

Senator LEVIN. As I understand your position, then, it is that as soon as we have efforts under way to close the gap, even though this gap, as you perceive it, is not closed, that as long as those efforts are under way, we can then begin again serious arms limitation discussions.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes; I don't have any particular opening date or closing date or window or anything of that kind in mind, but I think that at the present time the imbalance is very marked and very worrisome, and I think that we have to start making major efforts toward redressing that balance, and I think that at any time there are indications that negotiations after those signals have been given would be fruitful, there would be no reason in the world not to enter into them, but from a different posture, from a posture of strength, and growing strength.

Senator LEVIN. From a posture of "potential" strength, as I understand what you are saying this morning. In other words, we don't actually have to have the equality of strength as you perceive it, providing we are on the road back to it, for us to begin those arms control negotiations.

Mr. WEINBERGER. It will take quite a while to accomplish this redress of the balance, and there has to be a strong, firm, clear signal that we are resolutely embarked on that path and that we are in a situation of growing strength.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I have more questions, but I believe my 10 minutes has elapsed.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Good morning, Mr. Weinberger.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Good morning, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to begin by wishing you well because I am sure you will be confirmed.

It is an enormous job, one of just huge compass. You are up against quite a challenge. I wish you well.

Your reputation as a budget cutter has preceded you, and I know this area has already been plowed to some extent, and I apologize for being absent. I had two other committees to attend. But I do want to explore that just a little further.

Someone earlier mentioned the size, the great size of the military budget, and to be sure, it is very large, but expressed in terms of the percentage of the total Federal budget, the military budget has been, the Defense budget has been declining—

Mr. WEINBERGER. That's correct.

Senator HUMPHREY [continuing]. In recent years as a general trend, and is today much lower than it has been historically, even during times of peace.

And I find that many Americans are still under the impression that the military budget, the Defense budget is inordinately large, and I think it is important that they understand that it has actually shrunk a good deal, to our detriment, in my opinion.

But getting back to your reputation as a budget cutter, I know that you are in favor of increased defense outlays, but are you also, not only in terms of dollars, but are you also in favor of increasing the share of the total Federal budget which the defense sector occupies?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think that would follow, Senator. I have never been what is called in the budget business a percentage man. I have never felt that if you had an automatic percentage you were all right and if you didn't you were all wrong. I believe in funding and financing needs, and I think the military needs are very great now.

And with respect to budget cutting, I think it is essential that the Government not spend more than is essential in any field because I think that fosters inflation, and I think, unfortunately, we have seen the fruits of that far too vividly in recent years, so that it has indeed been my attempt in the past, and would continue to be, to try to make sure that what was spent was what was needed, and that we did not spend either unnecessarily or wastefully. And this would certainly apply to any field. It certainly applies to the domestic, nondefense sector of the budget, and those were the areas that I was primarily concerned with when these various comments or reputations or whatever seem to have arisen. I think partially it was because it was such a highly unusual posture at the time that it attracted so much attention. It seemed normal to me, but it didn't to anyone else.

Senator HUMPHREY. Don't get me wrong, I admire someone who is tightfisted. I wish we had more of them in this town. But the military budget has suffered—

Mr. WEINBERGER. That's correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. In recent years by comparison to other budgets so that in fact we are playing catchup.

Don't you see it that way?

Mr. WEINBERGER. We are indeed, and that's what I was trying to indicate to Senator Levin, that we have to start on that catchup quickly and resolutely, and we have to pursue it, and I think our allies have to view that as our path which, in my opinion, it will be.

Senator HUMPHREY. It seems to me that in recent years some of the more mundane items in the military budget have been given second place or third place or worse in the lineup of priorities.

Speaking of operations and maintenance matters and military construction, if, as I am sure you have, you have seen military bases, they are pretty run down and seedy looking. There are tremendous backlogs of capital improvement projects, military construction, and by the same token, the operations and maintenance portion of defense has not received sufficient priority, so that we have inadequate training, unrealistic training, for instance, curtailed flying hours for our pilots, which impacts upon not only readiness but morale and many other things.

What kind of emphasis are you going to give to those so-called more mundane items over the more glamorous and visible?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I fully agree with the importance and the need for doing that, and I do know from past experience that one of the first victims of any kind of restraint policy seems to be maintenance, and it is usually pretty poor economy.

I have also, I have to add as a personal note, trained with wooden rifles, and that was not very satisfactory either. It was some time before I learned how to take apart and put together the real one, and that was because there were not adequate supplies at that time, and that was too many years ago.

But I think that this is all part of what I meant by the high priority that I assign to readiness. I think that the quickest way we can improve our posture is to make ready what we now have. We all know that the procurement cycle is very long and new weapons systems are sometimes much too long in development in my opinion, and there are other things that look very promising for the 1990's and things of that kind. But the thing that we can do most quickly and most effectively is to improve all aspects of the readiness of what we now have. And I do believe that obviously a high part of that is getting the training up to standard, having enough to warrant additional training with real weapons. Manpower, certainly the point Senator Goldwater made about not having enough pilots or enough men to man the ships, these are very worrisome things.

And one of the elements of the supplemental that will be submitted for the 1981 budget will involve a recognition of the increasing cost of fuel and things of that kind that will be required to bring training to a state of readiness.

I also know that the only really effective—well, perhaps I shouldn't say the only, but the most effective—training is training under as live conditions as possible, with battlefield conditions being simulated to the greatest extent possible, and certainly the maintenance of what we have in the way of equipment and existing weapons and facilities is a very large part of it.

So I assign a very high priority to readiness, and I think that it is the thing that we can do most quickly that will be most effective in starting to regain the strength that I was talking about with Senator Levin just a moment ago.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me switch to the strategic area. I understand that the position of President-elect Reagan is in opposition to the SALT II Treaty as it presently stands.

What are your views on that treaty? Are you in agreement with President-elect Reagan in that respect or disagreement, and what are your views in general on the equity of the SALT II Treaty as it stands?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well earlier when you were at another meeting, Senator, I did mention that I was very strongly in favor of the conclusions reached in the 10 to 0 report of this committee with respect to the SALT II Treaty, and I understand that the President-elect shares those views.

I think an effort to negotiate a true strategic arms limitation that is effective and is not bogged down in technical detail about whether or

not launchers are involved and whether or not an intercontinental plane such as the Backfire is excluded, I think the need to negotiate an effective strategic arms limitation treaty is always going to be there. I don't think we should enter those negotiations from a position of weakness, and I think that we do have to demonstrate that we are gaining strength and improving our strength when we enter into subsequent negotiations of that kind.

But I think the process should continue. I think it is a useful and can be an effective process, but I would certainly not want to enter it from the point of view of feeling if we didn't get a treaty it was a failure. Sometimes the failure to get a treaty is a success.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I am glad to hear you say that.

Can we fairly conclude, then, that you will not be urging or advising President-elect Reagan to accept the treaty as it now stands?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, I would certainly not advise him to accept it, and that would be quite unnecessary in any event because I know from previous conversations with him and his public statements that he feels that this SALT II Treaty was not a treaty the United States should have entered into.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. I believe my time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jepsen.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Weinberger, and I, too, am confident of your confirmation, and I would confine my remarks primarily to manpower and personnel.

I would, however, like to digress from that area just for the first question, and that is that you have indicated, and according to the notes that have been taken for me here—and I apologize for not staying. It is not because of a lack of interest, it is because of a conflict of three committee meetings, all of which are meeting at the same time.

You have indicated this morning that there is too much waste, we can't afford waste, of course, the military buildup, that there is too much timelag.

Would you please comment on what management policies you feel can be brought to bear to improve the now very lengthy defense procurement cycle? Do you have some specific ideas in mind?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I do, Senator. They aren't terribly novel, but they do involve trying to secure on a temporary basis the advice and counsel of people who are very familiar with the procurement process in a number of large private enterprises. I think that one of the problems—and I certainly am not at this point qualified to speak of the problems or even of the result—but one of the problems at this point in my study seems to me to be that there is, first of all, a very large number of what we used to call, in baskets, that represent the number of steps in the process, and that each one of these involves a very lengthy review, and sometimes a reexamination and a redundancy that isn't warranted, although obviously the procurement of a new weapon system is an enormously important subject.

I would like to get the best advice of people in charge of very large procurement activities in the private sector and see if it is not possible to apply some of their expertise fully recognizing that there are major differences between Government and private enterprise.

I also would like to see a greater integration, to the extent it may be possible, of what is procured for all three services, and I understand this is quite a hornet's nest, and I may be treading into some extremely dangerous ground in this preliminary hearing. But I would like to think that there are some situations in which some of the items could be used by all three services, just as we are making a major effort, as I understand it, to encourage standardization, and that is too broad a term, but some kind of greater, simultaneous use or comparable use by a number of our allies in NATO.

And this, I would think, would be one of the things we would want to examine. Maybe it is not feasible. I don't know. But it seems to me that on preliminary examination it would be. But I do think there are a number of situations, some of which I am personally familiar with, where private enterprise is able to procure in a very effective manner, and I would hope that some of the advantages of this and some of the ways in which this is done might subject themselves to transference to Government.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you.

In the area of manpower, Mr. Weinberger, is it your view that military personnel problems are essentially supply and demand problems that can be solved with economic solutions?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No. I think that with the complex systems that we have now, and with the tasks that military personnel at all levels are called upon to perform, there has to be an emphasis on training and recruitment from the point of view of being able to secure that expertise, and I think it is that. I think a much higher degree of training is now required than perhaps was formerly required many years ago. And I think our recruitment has to recognize that, and I think it has to encourage that. And I think that a lot of the training can be given on the job, on the spot, and I think again we have to make a careful examination of the means of training and methods of training, because my impression is that we do train pretty well now, but we lose a lot of the people that we have trained and who are able to perform these complex tasks, and we lose them much too soon, so that we would want to try to do something, and I mentioned earlier, in the way of inducements, to remain in the service.

But I think we have to recognize that a great many of the tasks required by modern warfare require high degrees of skills and specialized training, and we would certainly want to recruit for that purpose.

Senator JEPSEN. As we discussed yesterday and you just alluded to, we have some combat readiness problems from our active duty forces, but we have an even more severe and serious problem of readiness in the event of mobilization.

Along those lines, what is your view of the role of the Reserves and the National Guard? Do you have any idea how they might be strengthened? Do you have any special plans for them?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think they should be strengthened, without any question, and I think that part of it would be getting usable equipment and weapons as close to the kind of actually issued and which that they would be using.

Again, I think there are some fiscal means of encouraging more Reserves to participate, and a higher degree of training. Many of the Reserve units are already at a high degree of training. Some are outperforming some of the Regular units I understand. But I do think that it is essential that we recognize that both the Guard provided by the States, under State control, and the Active Reserve have a very real role to play, and in our society where we have traditionally had a small proportion of the citizenry under full arms at all times, I think the Reserves become even more important because we will need to have, again under the heading of readiness, we may very well need a rapidly expandable force, and I don't think we can get that effectively if we do not have trained Reserves.

Senator JEPSEN. One last question.

Do I have time, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TOWER. Yes.

Senator JEPSEN. According to the notes provided me on your previous testimony here this morning, you indicated that in lieu of registration, you would want to improve the retention and recruiting first, or that seemed tied in with your thought process on registration.

Is this what you really mean?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Basically what I was trying to say, Senator, was that I would like to try the volunteer armed force with improved inducements and benefits to see if that can't produce the numbers and the kinds of people that we need to perform these various complex tasks that I mentioned a moment ago, and to provide sufficient numbers. I would like to think that that could be done, and I would like to see more conclusive tests than I am now aware of that it hasn't produced that.

Obviously if the situation arises where more manpower is needed, other steps would have to be taken, but there are very serious problems connected with a peacetime draft, and I am sure that the Governor would like to avoid that as long as he possibly could.

Senator JEPSEN. Of course, I will discuss this with your designees or you personally from time to time, I am sure, often. But really, we are having registration for mobilization and on down the road, not for our current needs, and I think that the concept of readiness and mobilization, although it must be all tied together, is certainly one that we must keep separate on one hand, and at the same time addressing the All-Volunteer Force and how it is working or not working on the other hand. Registration is, on a long-term basis, for mobilization and it is not to meet our current manpower requirements.

Do you have any problem with that? Do you believe that is accurate?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, certainly we would want to do everything that was essential and was shown to be essential to enable us in the event of any mobilization, which obviously we hope would never be necessary, to produce what is needed within the requisite period of time, and it is obviously a shortening period of time in the present type of warfare.

So whether or not registration as a continued permanent feature of American life is required I am not really prepared to say at this

time. I do know that we will have severe manpower needs, and they may very well be, as you have indicated, of a specialized character. I would sum it up simply by saying that I would hope we could secure what we need by means of the voluntary armed forces. If we cannot, I would certainly want to acknowledge it and ask for a change in policy.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As a junior member of the committee and a new member, it certainly is a delight to be a member of the Armed Services Committee and to welcome Secretary-designate Weinberger in appearing before the committee. I look forward to working with members of the committee and with the administration in preserving the security of this country and promoting readiness.

As my esteemed friend and colleague, the Senator from Maine, defined for me, the definition of a junior member is one who does not have a microphone, but be that as it may—and my friend from Maine will soon learn that junior members every once in a while do get microphones—we will be brief and to the point.

Senator COHEN. If you would yield just for a moment, last year we had testimony on recruiter fraud in the Army. I encouraged Senator Quayle to come on this committee, Mr. Chairman. I confess openly to some measure of fraud. I told him he would have an opportunity to ask questions during the first 2 years.

[General laughter.]

Senator QUAYLE. I take back all those nice things I said about my friend, the Senator from Maine.

Mr. Secretary-designate, everyone has congratulated you and indicated that you will have no problem, and due to your tremendous character and reputation, I look forward to voting for you. I wish you well and I know that you will do a good job and serve President-elect Reagan and serve our country.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I appreciate that very much, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you.

I have just a couple general questions.

As you know, any defense policy that we have is pretty much predicated upon what the Soviet Union is going to do, what are the intentions of the Soviet Union not only in relation to what they have done in Afghanistan and what they may do in Poland, but in particular, in the tremendous arms escalation that we have witnessed of that nation in the last two decades.

In your opinion, what do you see down the road in the 1980's and the 1990's to be the intentions of the Soviet Union? Do you think that they are going to continue in this arms race? Do you feel that they have made that decision to just go all out to try to get what everyone, terms superiority, a somewhat elusive phrase? What do you see as the intentions of the Soviet Union?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, it would be hard to assign any other intention than the one that you have indicated, that is, an intention, a desire, a plan to achieve a major imbalance as represented

by a tremendous growth on their side, and that is one of the things that I think has to be of concern.

I might say parenthetically and as perhaps a footnote, I think one of the things we have to do is continue to strengthen our intelligence capability. I think one of the most unhappy features of the last few years has been some feeling that there is something degrading or immoral about trying to discover the intentions of countries that may serve as threats to our freedom and our liberty. So I think we have to do a great deal to strengthen that capability.

But as far as my own assessment at the moment is concerned, it is obviously imprecise and not formed on any sort of adequate briefings or knowledge of the situation in the last 5 or 6 years. But I do feel that just the difference between what I knew at that time and what I could see of the forces that they had and what I have now learned in the briefings in the last few days, that I am now getting on a daily basis, that on any sort of rational assessment of what has happened, it does seem clear that their intention is to proceed with an attempt to secure an imbalance that would make it very difficult if not impossible for us to assert our interests or the interests of our allies in any portion of the world. And I think that obviously has to be totally unacceptable.

I think that it may well be that there are elements within the Soviet Union now that would recognize that an arms limitation of a meaningful character is something that would be of interest to both sides and in the best interests of both sides, as I think it would be, but I think it has to be a meaningful limitation, and not a highly technical series of calculations of weight and excluding this and including only launchers and not missiles or vice versa, and not including certain kinds of planes and things of that kind. I would think that the only kind that would be useful would be something that genuinely advanced the cause of peace by a limitation that made it clear that each side had sufficient strength so that they would be equally deterred from launching any sort of attack.

And my worry at the moment is that we are getting out of that kind of balance too rapidly.

Senator QUAYLE. As the Soviet Union appears to pursue the policy to reach a major imbalance, in theoretical terms and code words that are, as you well know, are very important not only in Washington but in diplomacy, what kind of posture are we going to try to attain? Is it going to be superiority, parity, rough equivalence, margin of safety?

Is there any sort of definitional term that this administration is going to apply to what we are going to try to achieve in our defense posture with the Soviet Union?

Mr. WEINBERGER. There are a lot of code words that are involved in this whole business, largely determined, I guess, by what fits into a headline. But one way or another, there has to be, in my opinion, the condition under which we are correctly perceived as sufficiently strong and resolute, and possessed of sufficient resources so that there will not be any inducement, in fact, there will be a major and effective deterrence for anybody contemplating launching an attack upon us. And if we reach that stage, then I think that whatever it happens to be called, it is a satisfactory state of balance.

I think that when you get an imbalance, you have an inducement to war. The greatest destabilizing force for peace today is the perception of America as irresolute and weak and not willing to take the steps necessary to gain a degree of strength that will deter attacks upon us.

When that is reversed—and I think this committee has done a great deal to start that reversal process—then I think we will be in a much safer and much better position. And I personally have no preference as to what that condition is called.

Senator QUAYLE. But it would be your opinion that we are not in a position of strength and adequate deterrence now.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Sadly, I have to agree we are not; no.

Senator QUAYLE. I notice from reading your biography that you were referred to at one time as a frustrated newspaperman, and we will have to talk to some of the headline writers, my background being in the newspaper business, to try to limit or expand the headlines as we would like to articulate.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Another part of my ill-spent youth, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. I don't look upon it that way for myself, but I am glad that you expressed your opinion.

One other final area on defense spending. Will you be taking any kind of a position on encouraging NATO allies, Japan, other allies to increase their defense spending as we increase ours?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Oh, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. And are there any set requirements that we should be communicating to our friends to accept a real increase in general—

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think real increases. As I mentioned earlier, I don't know that it is particularly useful to demand or talk about specified or fixed percentages of GNP, but I do think that, first of all, it is to everyone's interest in NATO and Japan and elsewhere to join in this effort. I think the effort can be vastly more successful and effective, and it can be achieved much sooner if there are a number of countries participating. I think we have had some good support. I think we need better support. Actually, even support isn't the right word because it is a mutual enterprise in which everybody in NATO and Japan and many of our other allies have exactly the same interest. I think we should try to increase our network of alliances, and the network of mutual participation in this effort.

I think there are various ways of doing it, and I would want to try to be as effective as possible in this effort. Indeed, I think since it is one of the ways in which we can redress this balance most quickly. A major effort should be devoted to it, and I would expect to do that, and I would try to be as effective as possible, by which I mean that I would try to secure a willing participation in this effort and a recognition of the importance of it to all the countries involved.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, I certainly share your concern and attitude toward cooperation because the day of the policeman of the world is here no longer. We are interdependent among ourselves, and for the survival of the free world, we have got to have this kind of cooperation, and defense spending is key.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I fully agree.

Senator QUAYLE. I would just leave with a comment that has been shared all along by a number of the Senators, and that is the area of manpower. I will confess to you that I don't know what the answer is. I don't know if the volunteer army is going to work. The draft has got its drawbacks politically. Politically, it may not be possible to have the draft. I am not even sure that it would be advisable. Universal service is also an option.

I would just hope that somehow we might be able, in a highly profiled way, to focus upon the manpower problems that we have. I know that there are going to be economic considerations that are going to be advanced in hopes of inducing people to serve our country. I really share a great deal of skepticism, and it is a concern that everyone else has, and there is no need to go into it again at this time.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I agree. It is not an area in which you can afford to follow a wrong course too long, but certainly we would want to give, I think, every opportunity, particularly with the improved inducements and benefits packages and things that we have been thinking about and talking about, to see if the volunteer effort can work; I would very much hope it could.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, I do, too. Good luck. I know you will do an outstanding job.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I will need it. Thank you very much.

Senator QUAYLE. President Reagan will be well served.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, an increasing number of people, including myself, have been trying to develop a new way of thinking about defense which goes beyond the traditional political debates about the size of the defense budget. It is obviously important to determine how much is enough. And that is a debate which will probably never end. But as I say, an increasing number of people are beginning to realize that that is not the end of the debate, that it is just the beginning. What is emerging, I believe, is a difference between those who look at defense issues in quantitative terms and those who look at them in qualitative terms.

What I would like to do in the course of a few minutes and a couple of questions is to get your own views on this, on how you feel about the tendency in recent years under both political parties and several administrations to approach the defense issue in quantitative terms, in terms of the number of dollars spent—what is usually called bean counting. This approach looks at defense in management and systems analysis terms. It judges officers and civilian officials in terms of their managerial efficiency. In contrast is an approach to defense which looks not only at the amount of money being spent, but how it is being spent. It looks at the concepts of warfare, at what you might even call the art of warfare, at the effectiveness of our weapons systems and force structures in the battlefield. It essentially attempts to reform our ways of looking at defense.

Do you have any thoughts, generally, along these lines?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, obviously, Senator, I would have to associate myself with the latter view that you have expressed. I don't

think that it is an effective measure to look solely at how much or what percentage. I like to see the end result. I would like to feel that we had the proper kind of Armed Forces, equipment, state of training, and weapons systems in development. I would also like to see an increasing use of and increasing evidence, perhaps, of the enormous lead we have always had in new technology, and in our whole inventive genius. These are the important things, and how they are turned into weapons that we hope may never have to be used, would be the only test.

Earlier—I think you were at another committee meeting—someone asked about whether or not a fixed percentage of GNP would be exacted of our NATO neighbors or something of that kind. I don't believe in these fixed percentages of GNP. I think that sometimes they may be too low, and sometimes they may be high enough to involve some waste. What I look at and like to look at is the end product, and are we getting the strength that we need. I have no doubt that that requires increased expenditures, but by the same token, I think that we will get a far more effective result if we look at what we are getting for it, and I think even more important, we will preserve a climate of American opinion which I believe now strongly supports this kind of improved readiness and redressing the strategic balance if the public is assured that there is not waste, or that there is a major effort made to try to avoid it.

Senator HART. What role should a Secretary of Defense play in this conceptual debate? I am thinking specifically about an article, which you may or may not have seen, in a recent issue of the Washington Post, focusing on an individual named Col. John Boyd and on a theory of warfare which Colonel Boyd has developed, and which is part of what I would call the reform approach to defense thinking. In that article, Colonel Boyd's theories about some of the errors in defense thinking in recent years are spelled out. He suggests we have continued to perpetuate what is called by reform thinkers a "firepower attrition" approach to warfare, where our past superiority in terms of materiel and manpower is projected into the future against potential foes that may be superior to us in both categories. What needs to be done is to consider a different approach to warfare, to the doctrines and concepts of warfare, that in effect commits this country to maneuver warfare, to outthinking our opponent instead of just running over him.

Can a Secretary of Defense play a role in that debate? Should he play a role in military doctrine, in the question of military education and promotion systems, in the problems of the increasingly bureaucratic decisionmaking process in the services?

How would you approach that?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I think he has to play a role in that. The Secretary of Defense has the ultimate responsibility of advising the President as to whether the Armed Forces of the United States are in condition and state of readiness to carry out the foreign policy of the country and the directives of the President as Commander in Chief. So I think he has, with that major responsibility, to participate in that kind of a debate and ultimately make recommendations to the President, and to the Congress with respect to the changes that may be necessary to carry it out.

Basically my feeling is that we have to be trained and ready to meet successfully whatever force may be used against us, and if attrition and overwhelming firepower at a given point is no longer a criterion or a means of judging whether or not you will be successful, then obviously there would have to be some changes made in that. Attrition always bothers me because I think long wars tend not to be won by anyone, and I think that you do have a great many new factors now, and that we cannot train for the last war; we have to train for whatever eventualities may occur as a result of current or predictable future conditions. That is why I think it is so vital to strengthen our intelligence capability, because we have to have, in effect, some observers out well in front of the given year to enable us to be ready if the time should ever come.

So I would certainly think that the Secretary of Defense does have to participate in that kind of discussion. There are various levels of expertise that have to be explored first, but ultimately under our system, the temporary guardians and trustees of these offices have to make the recommendations and sometimes the decisions. And I would fully accept that and expect to participate in that kind of series of recommendations to the President and to the Congress.

Senator HART. Beyond participation, however, the Secretary of Defense can play a key role in stimulating and encouraging debate and even dissent—

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator HART [continuing]. In the uniformed ranks and in the civilian leadership about the way we go about thinking about defense. He can, through, for example, changes in the officer promotion system, through enhancement of the prestige of those who do conceptual thinking, be not just a participant but a stimulant. That is what I am looking for.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I have no disagreement with that.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one final question?

Chairman TOWER. Two minutes.

Senator HART. On an area, Mr. Weinberger, that I personally have been very deeply involved in, the question of our maritime capability and the future of our Navy, it seems to me after several years of looking at this issue that there are three schools of thought. One would be represented by those who might be described as continental strategists, those who believe that our fundamental interests and commitments are land based and European based and center around our NATO commitments, and the role of the Navy in meeting those commitments is primarily as a tool for escorting supplies to Europe during a NATO war. The continental strategists tend to favor the construction of large numbers of frigates and other escort ships.

Another school would be the traditional school, which seems to favor large carriers, nuclear powered surface ships and submarines, and seems to be less concerned about the total number of ships than about the supposed capability of each individual ship.

Then finally, there are those of us who advocate what has been called a new concept, new technology navy which emphasizes increased numbers of ships, innovative technology and supplementing our nuclear powered fleet, both surface and submarine, with conventionally powered ships.

What, in general terms, could a Secretary of Defense do to stimulate debate among those three schools of thought and to sharpen the focus of what the future of this country ought to be in maritime terms?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Oh, I think he can do quite a bit. I think that there is a need to continue to encourage and to stimulate what is rather prosaically referred to as technology but which seems to me to be much better summed up under the term "the continuation of our inventive genius." I don't think we have lost any of this. I think this country still has an enormous lead in this area, but I am not sure it has been sufficiently encouraged, and I would think that that should be encouraged and that we should have a full and free debate and full opportunities for encouraging more and more development of things that take into consideration the new conditions or the changing conditions with which we are faced, sometimes on very short term notice.

I feel that the traditional role of the Navy of keeping open the sear lanes and the communications between ourselves and our allies, who are at great distance from us, is a vital and a continuing role. I think that the Navy very clearly has a major role to play should it become necessary for us to get into an offensive situation. And certainly if there are combinations of these, if there are new technologies not even yet on the horizon that can enable us to do this more effectively within the constraints of manpower that we seem now to have and things of that kind, then I think they should be fully explored and developed, and I think a lot of encouragement can be given to this by a Secretary.

One of the things that I found in previous governmental positions has been the enormous press of daily events and the lack of time to do any really long-range planning, and I hate to say it, but even long-range thinking. You never have enough time to think in these positions. What I would hope to do this time, should I be confirmed, would be to try to develop a major capability within the Department, taking full advantage of the advice of civilians and others, to start developing some longer range concepts that would perhaps produce a combination of the two schools of thought you spoke of.

But I think the Navy is obviously going to have a major role to play in our strategic capability. It is obviously going to have to play a major role in keeping our lines of communication in the seas open between ourselves and our allies, and I think there are a lot of other ways in which it can very clearly assist in our attack capability should that be needed.

But the ways of doing this, the ways of producing this I think are within the compass of the American people and our inventive genius, and I just want to make sure that that inventive genius is unleashed and is not either discouraged or not encouraged to the extent it should be.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Weinberger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Your time has expired, Senator.

The next Senator to question our witness is the ranking member of this committee from the standpoint of military experience. I think it is probably appropriate that we call on him after the line of questioning pursued by the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

Before I call on Senator Denton, who has been sitting here patiently for some time, I would like to impose further on his patience and note

that we will hold the record open until 5 p.m. tomorrow afternoon for any Senator that wishes to submit questions for the record. It is my understanding that Senator Stennis may want to submit some questions on behalf of other Senators who are not members of this committee, and we would extend that courtesy to any Member of the Senate.

And further, I might note that although the committee does not call on public witnesses to testify, that anyone who wants to submit a statement to the committee on this nomination may do so, and we will receive any such filed written testimony.

At this point I will recognize Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, I would like to state at the outset my admiration for your willingness to serve in such a severely difficult task. My mind goes back to the first Secretary of Defense and his very untimely death. The responsibilities of the job, as I think the chairman pointed out, and our former chairman, are comparable to those of the President of the United States. I admire you for that courage. I admire you for the versatility you have had in your background; and I certainly believe that that is a special qualification because it is an extremely comprehensive job, as you well know.

Senator Simpson, when he was giving an indoctrination to freshmen Senators, said we would get resumés from those who were applying for jobs, and read them and feel that they were so impressive that we were conscious we had spent our lives, our young lives, playing pool. And after reading your resumé, sir, I was humbled, as I am when I thank the chairman and the former chairman for their confidence, their expression of confidence, that the new members can contribute something to this committee whose work is known for its excellence throughout the years. And I am speaking in the presence of gentlemen I admire almost with a mythical image in my mind.

I have served under former Secretary Warner, so it is with humility bordering on fear that I undertake to question.

Chairman TOWER. If the Senator would yield, I have never known an admiral to be overburdened with either fear, reticence or timidity.

Senator DENTON. I will ask you only one question, sir, and it is rather philosophical.

We underwent a rather spectacular failure in our last major application of Armed Forces in combat, and I think we failed in Vietnam not because of lack of dollars, not because of a lack of military loyalty. In fact, I believe that it could probably be established that the performance of the Armed Forces was not at all a weak spot in that terrible experience.

Perhaps the loss of the issue may have resulted from the quality of integrated understanding of whether, when and how to use the human resources of this Nation in combat, integrated perhaps from the standpoint of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the public and the media.

I am going to ask you ultimately what you think perhaps might be the question, without wanting to refight that war, what lessons we may have learned, what better adjustments we can make to an integrated understanding, because you, as the hub of that wheel, the

spokes of the President, the Secretary of State and so on intersecting really at you, involving some of these major decisions: How to posture armed forces, how to compose them, how to use them if necessary. I am going to be asking you what you would derive as lessons.

We certainly overlooked the main lesson of Korea, which could be postulated in what Ridgeway and MacArthur both advocated as their legacy to us: that we not engage in a major land war in Asia in order to settle a political problem. We went ahead and did it again, and we did it in spades as a great part of the aspect of that war.

Now maybe we are regaining a perspective. I think people are, I think the Congress is, I think the media area, and I can't think of a better man, looking at your background and listening to your answers today, to serve in that capacity.

But would you be kind enough to offer some views, especially following those respecting Tsun Tzu and Colonel Boyd.

I won't ask you to be too specific, and we are talking about new wars, and yet Tsun Tzu, you know, lived around 2,500 years ago or so, and some of the things he said might be worth our taking a better look at today.

And I would ask you, sir, if you would undertake to suggest what you believe to be some of the things we might adjust so that we might do better, some of the lessons to be derived from that experience.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, Senator.

I might say it is with considerable trepidation that I addressed naval matters in response to previous questions, in view of your presence on the committee.

In Vietnam there were acts, I fully agree, of enormous heroism and enormous skill by the American Armed Forces, not the least of which was your magnificent record in that conflict.

I think the principal lesson I would draw from that was perhaps twofold. One was that it is not really possible, no matter what the skill, nor the size, nor the effectiveness of the American forces, to fight a war that does not have the understanding of the American people and the support of the American people. And I think another and perhaps subsidiary lesson from that would be that we cannot and should not enter a war that it is not vital for our national security to enter, and we should never enter a war that we do not intend to win or in which we do not expend every single effort of every weapon and every facility that we have to win.

If we have to be in a war, then it has to be, in my opinion, serious enough and severe enough for our national survival so that we should not be asked to fight—none of the men involved should be asked to fight—under any circumstances than the maximum employment of every strength that we have as a Nation.

And I think that was one of the problems we had in Vietnam. We went into it on kind of a dragged in sort of basis over the years. We never had a formal kind of declaration. For a long time—and it is in my opinion one of the principal causes of inflation today—we attempted to fight a major war without admitting it and without any of the civilian sacrifices that are necessary for a major war, and we asked enormous sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of Americans, which they gladly gave.

It was not the kind of situation we should be in again because it was not the kind of struggle that was essential for our national survival, and we did not enter that war with any intention apparently of winning it. And that to my mind is a very serious indictment of what was done because of the effect on the men and women who were asked to participate in that kind of a conflict. We lost thousands of lives, and we at no time made clear to the American people the vital necessity of it or the fact that because we were participating, it was a war that we did have to win, in which we were willing to expend all of our efforts and all of our skills and all of our resources. And that I would hope would never happen again.

This is not to say that we may never get in a war again. We may very well have to. But I think one of the terrible legacies of Vietnam was the crippling effect it had on any kind of strong policy thereafter. And I believe with you that we are now past that point. I hope we are. We cannot be perceived as a Nation that was so crippled by a mistake of that kind that we will never again use our strength, because then we are encouraging war in my opinion.

But I think that what was done in that war involved great sacrifice, involved great skill and great heroism on the part of thousands of people. But it was not understood, it was not supported by the American people. It was not, in the final analysis, considered a necessary war or a war that we felt we had to or desired to win. And I think that was a tragic mistake, and I hope that that lesson would be fully appreciated, but I also hope that the corollary of that lesson was also appreciated. And that is, when it is necessary to our national survival, we are fully prepared and ready in all senses—and that is the responsibility of this Department that I have been asked to head—to provide the kind of support and the ability to win a conflict which it is essential for our survival and our safety to win.

Senator DENTON. Well, maybe it was a necessary war; maybe it was not. I heard as big a dove as ever developed, a wonderful diplomat, say in 1963, from the stage of the Naval War College, that it was a place where it had become necessary for us to apply military force. It seems that we just applied it in a confused way.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I don't disagree with that. Once we entered it, it became a war that we should have won. We should not enter nor we should not get our troops into a situation and then say you can go to this line and no further, or you ought to do this and nothing more.

If the troops are committed, if we are in an active engagement, we have every obligation and every duty then to go all the way forward and win. I do not want to be misunderstood on that.

But the mistake, the error, the tragic nature of the error was that we committed thousands and thousands of Americans, suffered huge losses without any kind of a firm, clear or settled intention to win. And I think one of the frustrating and difficult things for Americans, particularly those who participated, was the knowledge that had we done that we would have been successful militarily.

Whether or not we should have ever started is a subject of long debate and all of that, but once we were in to the extent that we were, not to pursue it was a tragic breach of trust of the men involved.

Senator DENTON. Well, I think your experience in the press will serve you well in this job, because I believe you have your finger on one extreme weakness. We did not explain it as we went along and as we understood it or thought we understood it ourselves in the Government, and therefore it was not possible for the people to understand it. And then it became a gamesmanship thing, fun and games between the Department of Defense and in many cases some members of the media to contend with each other, with the military in my opinion developing its occupational diseases, and on the other side of the coin perhaps the media also.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I would have to compare it, Senator, with World War II when there was almost total unanimity of feeling that this was a vital and necessary war for America to participate in, and our participation was as successful as it's always been in the past and can be in the future.

Senator DENTON. I guess that is Tsun Tzu's lesson, totality.

Chairman TOWER. The Senator's time has expired.

The Chairman recognizes Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary, that I had to leave for a confirmation hearing of one of your colleagues as well.

As a Secretary-designate you have a formidable task, our adversaries the Soviets are probing our resolve on many fronts. As a Nation we've stood still for the past 10 years because of our mistaken trust in the SALT process while the Soviets have pushed on in virtually every field.

Wherever we have looked there is reason to worry, and a recent article in Aviation Week highlighted the sea trials of the Soviets' latest submarines. They're the Typhoon and Alpha class subs. The Typhoon has twice the displacement of our latest Trident submarine. Not only is it twice as big, it is double-hulled with more than 10 feet of separation between hulls, filled with water, which by all reports makes it virtually impenetrable. Also, the Alpha sub is reportedly titanium-hulled, can dive deeper and outrun anything we have. In fact, the speed differential is so great it is alleged that our Mark-48 torpedo, our best and biggest, cannot catch the Alpha sub.

Now, one of the things that's made our Nation great in the past has been our supremacy on the seas. As a maritime power we were able to move wherever we were needed in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam. And as an energy-dependent Nation we need to maintain that capability to import raw materials, particularly oil.

For the Soviets to field these new submarines they had to start 10 years or more ago. For us to do the same will take a similar lead time. In my view this demonstrates the stealth of the Soviets and the fallacy of not insisting upon onsite inspection in any of our SALT negotiations. To depend upon satellite surveillance is sheer nonsense. What we now need is a crash program to develop a missile of sufficient implosive power to nullify the new Soviet subs. Unless we do, we will witness a change in the balance of sea power and sea warfare.

Are you aware of this new threat, and if you are, is anything being done about it?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I am aware of it as a result of recent briefings. Without commenting on the performance characteristics of the Soviet subs, I do think that this again illustrates one of the problems of the strategic imbalance that I mentioned a few moments ago when you were at another hearing that has to be redressed. And there is no question at all that these things do take a very long lead time and that when a lead of this kind, a strategic lead or a strategic imbalance, is established, we then have to address the most rapid measures that will be effective in doing that.

And certainly one of the things, one of the options that will have to be examined very carefully if proven to be effective, brought on line as quickly as possible, would be the implosive effect that you just mentioned. We would have to secure that or some other means.

But this is the kind of development that has been taking place, and we have to, and I'm sure can, match them.

Senator CANNON. Another area of concern is tank warfare. The British have developed a laminated armor consisting of steel and plastic plates that according to newspaper articles makes bazookas bounce off like popcorn. The Soviets have now adopted this technique, and so we need to develop hypervelocity kinetic energy penetrators to meet this new Soviet challenge.

Have you been briefed on this new development, and are we doing something about that?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Not on that one specifically, I have not, Senator, but I will certainly ask for it, and I would assume we would have full briefings on all of those matters.

Again, to get back to a point that I raised in connection with procurement earlier, we have had a tank in procurement for a very long time, and I would hope one way or another to try and shorten that time and at the same time secure the most effective weaponry possible. And if there's a new development of that kind that has been developed by the British, then, I would certainly think that we would want to make every effort to share in that throughout the NATO system.

Senator CANNON. Of course. The additional areas that are of concern to me are the laser and particle beams which are very important that we move ahead on.

Now, another question pertains to the Triad missiles, the submarines and strategic bombers. In the missile area the MX is very much on my mind because of its impact on my home State of Nevada. There's a lot of speculation about the administration's intentions reference continued reliance on the Minuteman.

Whatever is done should be decided promptly to avert any unwarranted delay. Do you have any information on what is to be the status of the MX program?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, sir, not finally or conclusively. That would involve in the new administration a rather full-scale presentation and a discussion, since it is a major issue, as you indicate, from a number of points of view, with the President. And I have not had the opportunity either to educate myself sufficiently or to have briefings of that kind, but I am aware of the number of issues involved.

I don't have any doubt at this point that a strengthened missile of the MX type is necessary. I do think, as I indicated earlier, that the

problem requires that we get some kind of protected site, some kind of site that can effectively be utilized without very early discovery and identification by the Soviets and hence subjected to the same form of potential problem that some of the existing sites that are now targeted.

Senator CANNON. This committee provided in the legislation that not more than 50 percent of the MX program could be located in any one area; namely, Utah or Nevada. Prior to a study of the split basing mode—and the study is due back to the committee by February 1—is that report on target so far as you know?

Mr. WEINBERGER. The Department has advised me that they are working on that report. I am not advised as to whether it is on target or not, but we can certainly find out for you.

Senator CANNON. Now the conference report on the fiscal year 1981 Department of Defense budget states that:

The Secretary of Defense shall pursue full-scale engineering development of a strategic bomber with the ability to perform the missions of a conventional bomber, cruise missile platform, and nuclear weapons delivery system in both the tactical and strategic role with an initial operational capability of not later than 1987.

Further, the Secretary shall submit a status report to the Committee on Armed Services of both Houses by March 15, 1981, including comparisons of the B-1, derivatives of the B-1 and the FB-111 aircraft.

Now, that certainly is going to be a big order. Of course, the conference committee didn't expect a new Secretary of Defense when that order was written. But I think that this is an important matter that needs to be addressed, and I for one certainly hope that you will be submitting that report on schedule by March 15.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, my information is that that has slipped a bit, by the Department. I gather that there is a possibility of supplying some comparatively rough figures on the various options within a few weeks of the settled date. But the details or the kinds of figures which I would expect and I know the committee would expect would be delayed a few months beyond that.

I would certainly make every effort if I am confirmed and assume office to speed that up; but the information I have at the moment is that there is likely to be some delay or some slippage in that particular requirement.

Senator CANNON. There is an article in the January 5, 1981, issue of Newsweek captioned, "The Soviet War of Nerves," and it talks about the Soviet subs moving dangerously close in August of 1978 to the east coast of the United States and thereby significantly raising the threat to five SAC bases along the east coast, from South Carolina to Maine where B-52 and FB-111 bombers were stationed.

General Ellis, the commander of SAC, recommended to this committee stretching the FB-111 fuselage as an interim measure, to provide some added capability in that manner.

My time is up. I was going to ask you if you have any views on that.

Mr. WEINBERGER. That is one of the options. The other is to proceed with the modified B-1, and there are other options. It is on this, as I understand it, that the Department is now developing figures, but I am told that there may be more delay than I guess any of us would like to see; and I don't assign any blame or fault to this. But I would certainly regard it, as you say, as a major decision and one that ought

to be made very quickly, because again, in my view decisions are extremely important even if we don't get the very finest or latest of technologies that could be in.

I know when I was running the budget a few years ago, 7 or 8 now, the B-1 was almost ready for production, and it was called back, to the best of my memory, for some redesign because some new technologies had become available. And the result is, as you know, we not only do not have it, we do not even have authorization for it any more. So I think it is vital to get decisions and get them made and proceed on them.

And what is being studied by the Department in response to the conference committee is the material necessary for such a decision.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. This concludes the first round of questions. Before I call on Senator Stennis I would like to get some indication as to what Senators may have additional questions they would like to ask so that we can determine whether we can conclude the hearings this morning or schedule another hearing for this afternoon.

Will the Senators please give some indication if they have additional questions before I call on Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I only have one.

Chairman TOWER. I'll first call on Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I think your budget experience, as well as others, has served you well, and you are certainly coming in well prepared. I want to make this comment on priorities.

Before we dive into this \$600 billion budget, there are many, many questions to decide. You have many recommendations to make. Let me just observe one thing.

We have the unfinished question of the SALT Treaty. Our committee had good, extensive hearings on that. I was not satisfied with that treaty. I said then I couldn't support it unless there could be something more done. Generally, it did not have enough support anyway. It was left lying there.

But in view of the conditions this year, I really hope you won't bring up the SALT Treaty now. As important as it is, and I think everyone favors it to a degree, it was a question of what was in the treaty. The successful candidate for President—the main candidates—all favored it. So, the need is there.

I hope you don't bring the treaty up this year, because, obviously, a lot of work has to be done, as you have said. We have conditions here that I think on a priority basis have to be met.

I'm referring now to the enormous interest rate. No one has a full solution at this point, but this thing is riding hard on the backs of the people, and I'm talking about the so-called little people—the small businesses, businesses not so small, and even larger businesses, as I understand.

I hope that in using your great talent you will move in on that problem as a priority. I really think this could stagnate or become calamitous. I'm not predicting it will, but if we don't act, the stress will be on us more and more.

So, we can have this stronger military program and other programs, but let's give the right priority here. It will stir the people

and give them more confidence than anything I know. I thought this was relevant to mention at this point, and I hope that you will take that seriously.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I do think it is relevant, Senator; yes. As I mentioned, I think one of the principal causes of inflation is government overspending over the years, and that we do have to be conscious of the overall picture at all times.

Chairman TOWER. It is my understanding that Senator Levin has additional questions.

Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm interested in your philosophy of linkage, and I wonder if you would share that with us.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I didn't hear the beginning, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Your philosophy of "linkage," could you share that with us?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think obviously it's a very broad question, but in this modern world there is a very substantial interdependent effect of events on each other; and I think we have to be conscious of that. I think that various actions we take have to be consistently in the national interest. And if we do have one set of proposed courses that seems desirable, I think before blindly adopting it we have to examine and assure ourselves that the effect of that decision is going to be consistent with and supportive of our broad national interest.

That is a very broad answer, but I'm sure you have more specifics in mind.

Senator LEVIN. Let me pursue the "linkage" issue with a more specific question. If we negotiate an arms limitation treaty which you concluded was clearly in our national interest and included real reductions of nuclear weapons, and if there was real parity, and if there was real verifiability would you recommend its execution and its ratification even though the Russians were still in Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I would like to see the terms of the treaty. I think that we would have very likely—and what I would strive for—would be a treaty that in addition to securing all of the very worthy goals which you suggested also set the stage for such negotiation, recognizing the feelings that are correctly in existence in this country, and attempted to bring about some kind of suitable withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan as part of the terms of the treaty itself.

In the final analysis I don't know what the proper negotiating posture would be at that time. Negotiations are best conducted under conditions in which the negotiators have freedom to reach the very best agreements possible. And there are a number of different circumstances, there are a number of different things that can happen at that time.

I would think that I would want to be sure that the treaty was fully as effective as you said and see if it was not possible to secure a more firm basis for a prospective successful application of those treaty principles by a better atmosphere which would include withdrawal from those territories.

Senator LEVIN. And if you were satisfied after that review that the treaty was in our interest and if you were unable to secure as a part

of those negotiations withdrawal from Afghanistan, would you still recommend the treaty?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, you're asking for disclosures of positions that might affect our negotiating posture in which I might have to participate; and I would ask your leave not to respond directly to that any more than I have already.

What I would like to do would be to secure the best possible treaty in the interest of the United States, and you have certainly described a treaty along those lines in your opening paragraphs.

The conditions that I would want to impose to try to secure adoption of such a treaty and the way in which I would go about trying to bargain for it if I were participating in the negotiations I think would be most effective if we haven't disclosed all the positions at this time.

Senator LEVIN. Would it be a fair characterization of your testimony to say that you would not necessarily require withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan before you recommend ratification of an arms control agreement you determined was in our national interest?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think that's fair enough. I wouldn't know enough about the condition of the negotiations to feel at this time that one would have to take a position—a specific, fixed position—on any feature of it; so I think that would be a fair enough response, yes.

Senator LEVIN. Earlier you spoke about maximum deployment of every military capability and every weapon we have as a Nation in any war that we are in if we're going to get into it. Would you have recommended the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I was not connected with the Government when we were in any kind of decisive stage of that conflict, but it just seems to me, Senator, that if it is a serious enough situation to warrant a war and warrant a committal of U.S. forces, we owe it to them to be ready, not necessarily to do it but to be ready to utilize the strengths that we have.

It is still possible, I believe, to fight some wars using conventional forces that don't involve nuclear weapons; but when you telegraph in advance that you're never going to do it, or that you don't need to win, or you don't wish to proceed beyond a certain point. I think you have made it virtually impossible for the faith of the American people who are committed to that war and actual combat to be realized. And I think that is a very serious deficiency.

I think it is perfectly possible that wars could be fought without resort to nuclear weapons. But I think that if you advise potential opponents in advance that you do not intend to utilize the strength that you have or you do not intend to cross certain lines, that you have almost assured another Vietnam, which is the kind of situation which I think we have to avoid in the future.

Senator LEVIN. I would agree that we shouldn't telegraph in advance that you might not use nuclear weapons, but I don't think you should say in any way that you will use them. You're not saying that are you?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Any time you get into a war the possibility that you will use every weapon available has to be left open.

Senator LEVIN. I welcome that clarification.

Do you favor strategic superiority?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, again, we had a discussion with Senator Quayle and others on the labeling process. I go back to what I said before. I favor a condition under which we have sufficient strength and it is known that we have sufficient strength, and that we have sufficient will and resolution so that our retaliatory ability is such that no nation would risk any kind of attack upon us. And whatever anybody wants to label that is perfectly all right with me.

I think that is the essence of the doctrine I think we have to achieve.

Senator LEVIN. So you wouldn't want a label such as "nuclear inferiority" on that doctrine, I'm sure.

Mr. WEINBERGER. What I worry about and what I commented on is the imbalance which I think has now developed, which you correctly characterized as a real gap, not a 1960 gap, and one that I think has to be closed and that imbalance redressed. And that is what I would regard as a major, major priority of the Department.

Senator LEVIN. I didn't characterize it as a "real gap." I was quoting you.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think when you look at some of the things Senator Cannon mentioned a minute ago, when you look at some of the abilities that have been developed with a number of different Soviet missiles, when you look at the Backfire bomber, when you look at a number of different areas around the world, and the strength of the Soviet Navy and so on, you would conclude, as I have, on the basis of recent briefings, that we are not in as sound a position from the point of strategic balance as I think we have to be; and I do think we have to redress that.

Senator LEVIN. I have additional questions. I don't know if I have additional time. I think I could perhaps wind up in 5 more minutes if I have that much time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Go ahead. If you can, Senator, we'd like to wind up by 12:30. That way I can recess the meeting.

Senator LEVIN. I'd be glad to cooperate, and my additional questions beyond that can be for the record.

As part of the equation one must look at to determine if we've got sufficient military horsepower, one must look at the sources of the Department of Defense and the Institute of Strategic Studies on the military balance. I would like to now quote their findings by both these sources and ask whether you agree with them in terms of their conclusions and that "real gap," as you put it.

Would you agree that NATO, the NATO nations compared to the Warsaw Pact nations have about 200,000 more men under arms?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I am not familiar with those specific studies that you cite. My impression, is on the basis of the briefings and the examination I have been able to make, that the ground forces facing the NATO nations, the ground forces of the Soviet Union facing the NATO nations, have superiority at the present time.

Senator LEVIN. In terms of numbers?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I'm sorry.

Senator LEVIN. In terms of numbers?

Mr. WEINBERGER. In terms of overall effective strength.

Senator LEVIN. Let me just read you a few figures to see if you quarrel with any of these or disagree with them. In terms of antitank guided weapons do you have any problems with this figure: That NATO has twice as many of these weapons as do the Warsaw Pact nations?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I'm not really in a position to comment on that. I think we have a very good capability and a very good actuality in antitank guided weapons at the moment. But again, there is a very large number of Soviet tanks that are capable of being brought to bear on the NATO forces.

Senator LEVIN. Well, sometimes we just look at the tanks; we don't look at the antitank weapons. And I'm wondering whether as part of your review of that military balance equation you looked at the antitank weapons.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I do indeed because I think what I have to look at is the means of redressing what I call this imbalance as quickly as possible; and I think one of the ways you obviously would try to do that would be defensive weapons of this sort rather than trying to match a tank production which has a very large disparity.

Senator LEVIN. Running through just a few other conclusions, and I'll just ask you the question at the end of the list. These are just some examples. Those studies view our capacity of strategic and tactical airlift as superior to that of the Soviets/Warsaw Pact; our capacity at amphibious lift vastly superior; our quality of tactical aircraft, especially for air-to-air combat, superior; our capabilities to replenish naval combat, superior; NATO's number of major service combatants, 400 compared to the Warsaw Pact's 235; quality and reliability of our allies, superior; the lethality of artillery and rockets, superior; numbers and quality of our sea-based tactical aircraft and carriers for offensive strike missions, far superior.

I'm not going to go into all the rest, but I'm wondering whether or not you have any differences with those that you know of, and if not, whether you've taken them into account.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I do have differences with some of those that you have mentioned, and it may be as a result of imperfect information or additional information which might change those views.

I do feel that there are some inferiorities in some of those categories in which you've cited the NATO nations, including ourselves, as having a superior capability. I would certainly want to examine it very closely. I would not want to rearm America on the basis of rumor, so to speak. I would certainly want to be as sure of our facts as we could be, and that's why I think our intelligence capability has to be improved.

But I would want to act decisively on the best information available, and I have to say that I do have some disagreements with those characterizations you've just quoted.

Senator LEVIN. Could you enumerate a couple of your disagreements for me?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I would be a little surprised if the airlift capability that we would have considering our different geographies

is that much superior. I would be a little surprised about the effectiveness of combative vessels; and again, I'm not as much interested in the total number of vessels as I am in what they can do, and where they are, and where they can be based, and how effectively they can be brought to bear.

And it's in those areas of effectiveness that I have some concern. If someone has counted up the numbers on both sides and seems satisfied with the ratio of numbers, that's one thing. I'd like to go a lot further and find out what it is that those individual numbers can deliver, and where, and when, and how accurately.

So these would be the areas in which I would want to indicate some dissent from those conclusions. I hasten to add, however, that I haven't studied that particular report. I have had other briefings. And what I have found I find to be thus far quite disquieting. If there is other evidence, I'd like to see it, too.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe we should have a statutory limit on the number of high school graduates that we recruit, that there be a required, fixed percentage of high school grads in the Army?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Generally, as I mentioned before on all of these things, I have suspicion of fixed quotas, of fixed percentages. I much prefer to look at the people involved and their own capabilities.

Senator LEVIN. I think I'd better save the rest of the questions. There may be others who have questions, Mr. Chairman. I do have some for the record.

Chairman TOWER. There are no other Senators seeking the recognition so—

Senator LEVIN. I'll use my last 2 minutes then if that's all right with the Chair.

Several times during the Presidential campaign Governor Reagan stressed the need for—

Chairman TOWER. Would you yield a moment, Senator, to entertain a consent request from Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. I didn't mean to interrupt. I ask consent, Mr. Chairman, that the questions put forward by the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Proxmire, be admitted to the record for the usual consideration in answering.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I'll be glad to furnish an answer for the record, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Without obligation, agreed to. Proceed, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Several times during the Presidential election campaign Governor Reagan stressed the need for more careful targeting of Federal procurement to assist areas experiencing severe unemployment problems. I'm wondering whether you share his concern.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, my understanding is that nearly a third of the recent Defense Department contracts were let in areas of unemployment, labor surplus, or however you want to phrase it. I think that it is a matter of concern, of course.

In the final analysis I don't think you can use the procurement process, and I don't think the Governor intends to use the procurement process, to redress a social problem. I do think that you have to use

the procurement process to produce at the least possible cost the most effective and best equipment that we can have. And quite frequently that can be done, as the recent experience has demonstrated, with nearly a third of the contracts going to areas where there is high unemployment. That has to be, should be a factor in everybody's mind.

But in the final analysis I don't think that you can utilize the procurement process to cure an unemployment problem. I think we have to attack the root cause of that which is the economy and the need for more job-producing—stimulation and encouragement and more job-producing activities everywhere, and all the rest.

But if you're speaking about the Maybank amendment, I have to tell you I do not favor repeal of it.

Senator LEVIN. Let me try to clarify, at least in my own mind, something you said this morning which I think is really critical.

Chairman TOWER. Would the Senator yield for a moment?

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

Chairman TOWER. The Senate must convene shortly to march over to the House for the joint session of Congress. Can the Senator finish his questioning in the next 2 or 3 minutes?

Senator LEVIN. Yes, I just have one last question if time is available. and will submit additional questions for the record. I want to refer again to the Persian Gulf for one moment, because I think it is critical to the national interest. In fact, I think you said this morning you believe that the Persian Gulf area is vital to our national interest.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, I do.

Senator LEVIN. But you left me with two inconsistent positions, and perhaps that's in my mind, and if so, could you clarify them.

One position is that the Carter doctrine to defend that region commitment be renewed—that nothing should be done to detract from the commitment to preserve our vital interest in the Persian Gulf. The second statement is we don't have the military capability to carry out that commitment.

I view your second position as watering down a commitment so that it's of very little deterrent value, making it almost useless—

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I can possibly clear up the confusion by saying I think the way in which the commitment was given was extraordinarily clumsy and ill advised. I think that it was done not with advance consultation as is in my opinion required, and not in such a way that indicated the feeling that our military presence there was necessary and was a vital part of the interest of the countries concerned, as well as the interest of ourselves and the Western World.

But I also think that we can help to carry out that commitment with what we have, but I do not believe we have the strength now to insure the completion of that commitment; and I think we should do something about that as quickly as possible.

I don't think there's any watering down involved or any interpretation of global or geoeconomic theory or policy that could possibly conclude we did not have a vital interest in the Arabian Gulf area.

Senator LEVIN. I'm not suggesting that. What I am suggesting is that when you say we don't have the military power to carry out that commitment while at the same time you believe it should be renewed or it should not be watered down, that you're giving very different sig-

nals, and that I believe you're giving a confusing signal which upon, I hope, further study that you would not persist in.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I don't think so, Senator, because I think that it is perfectly possible and proper to recognize and be aware of the vital necessity and nature of a particular part of the world, and the whole Arabian Gulf area is clearly in that category.

I do think that we have to recognize that while we do have an interest and can properly, with the consent of the countries involved, make that kind of a commitment, we may have to take additional actions at home and provide additional encouragement to our NATO and other allies to help that be carried out. And it was in the latter connection that I was speaking. I think we do need additional actions to help us carry out that commitment conclusively and finally.

I think we can make a start on it. I think we have. We already have some AWACS planes deployed there, and that plus some other things is what I think we have to do and continue to do, perhaps on an increasing scale if the countries involved desire it.

But I don't think there's anything confusing or inconsistent in recognizing the vital nature of that area of the world to ourselves and the free world, and recognizing also this recognition and this commitment involves a continuing commitment to increase our ability to help us carry out this commitment. I do think that part of the problem is the way in which the commitment was given.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Weinberger, thank you very much. I think you've given a very impressive performance here today, and I anticipate that your nomination will be dealt with favorably by this committee.

As soon as we've been satisfied that all of the requirements under the rules and under the statutes relative to your financial position have been complied with, we'll set a time to act as a committee on your confirmation.

As everybody I assume knows, there can be no action taken by the Senate until after President-elect Reagan has been sworn in, but I think we can act in a conditional way in this committee and have that nomination ready for confirmation on the Senate floor soon after the inauguration of President-elect Reagan.

I expect that we will act with dispatch, and as soon as we clear up the statutory matters we will act. And I think we're well on the way to that, and I anticipate no difficulty.

Congratulations on your appointment, Mr. Weinberger. If past history is any indication, you'll be a frequent guest of this committee, and we look forward to working with you.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I would look forward to it, Senator, and I would be derelict if I did not say that I deeply appreciated the warmth and the very generous comments and the very fine treatment that I've had this morning. I've been much impressed and very grateful for all the things that were said, and I would certainly hope I would be able to live up to the very nice assessments, very overgenerous statements that have been made this morning.

I thank you all very much.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much.

[Questions submitted for the hearing record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PERSIAN GULF/MIDDLE EAST CONCERNS

Senator LEVIN. My recent trip to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf underscored to me the need for us to improve our military command structure for planning, programming and operating the forces charged with the responsibilities to defend the Persian Gulf. Presently there seems to be great potential for the defense of this region to be undercut by conflicting priorities, plans, programs, and operations between the European and Pacific Commands, EUCOM and PACOM.

What are your comments about these present command relationships, the prospects for potential conflicts between them and about one of the solutions proposed to remove this potential problem—creation of a new Command and Commander-in-Chief for the Middle East/Persian Gulf?

ANSWER. The implied suggestion that a new command be created for the Middle East/Persian Gulf area is most interesting. It is my intent carefully to review the command structure in that part of the world and make whatever changes are required. The need for a Middle East/Persian Gulf command will be carefully considered.

Senator LEVIN. When will you be in a position to recommend to the Congress and the President whether such a new command should be created?

ANSWER. It is difficult at this time to say what the time frame will be. There are numerous other factors that must be resolved, such as the size of the force that can be deployed to the region, before any decision can be made concerning the command structure. I can only assure the Committee that I will address these matters on a priority basis and make whatever decisions have to be made as quickly as possible.

Senator LEVIN. My trip also indicated the need for more high level civilian and military cooperation among ourselves, our Allies and the nations of that region, regarding the region's defense. Although this coordination seems to be active and growing at the working forces levels, what efforts can you, as the new SECDEF, and the new administration take to bring about more high level coordination among ourselves, our Allies and the nations of the Middle East/Persian Gulf in military matters relating to the defense of the region?

ANSWER. The Middle East, of course, is a very critical area and certainly a very volatile part of the world. The need for close cooperation among the nations in the region, the United States and several of our key allies seems to me to be very critical. As Secretary of Defense, I will make every effort to develop better cooperation in that part of the world. The volatility of the region and the external threat require the highest level of cooperation possible.

Senator LEVIN. The Carter administration sought the establishment of U.S. military facilities in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. It has been thwarted in efforts to establish permanent bases in such locations as Saudi Arabia.

What type of American military presence would you like to see in the region? What role do you envision for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and other states in the pursuit of such policy?

ANSWER. The United States must, of course, maintain a major naval presence in the region. I would hope that we can work out arrangements among our friends and allies to increase the security of the region and of the individual states. Although I am not prepared at this early date to say where additional U.S. forces or facilities might be stationed or located, the matter is of top priority and I intend to carefully review the need for additional U.S. force deployments in the region.

Senator LEVIN. In April 1982, Israel will turn over to Egypt its air bases in the Sinai. What role in American military planning do you envision for these bases? Do you intend to seek to persuade Egypt to make these available for American use?

ANSWER. The air bases in the Sinai are excellent facilities. I will certainly look at them in light of the President's foreign policy for the region and the security needs of the United States, the Western World and certainly the Middle East

itself. There are, of course, other countries in the area where U.S. forces might be located. I intend to review all of the possibilities prior to making any recommendations to the President.

Senator LEVIN. The United States and Egypt recently engaged in joint RDF exercises. Is the United States planning more joint air exercises with Egypt, as reported in Egypt's press? Are there any plans for joint United States-Israel exercises? If not, why? Would you seek and/or support such joint exercises? Do you feel they would be useful?

Answer. The joint exercise between the United States and Egypt was a good start. It gave each country an opportunity to better understand the tactics and doctrine of the other. It certainly generated some positive diplomatic and political benefits as well.

As far as Israel is concerned, the United States has a high degree of understanding of Israeli military tactics and doctrine. Israel certainly is a key military power in the region. It would be premature for me to endorse joint exercises at this point. I will carefully review the suggestion, however.

Senator LEVIN. Saudi Arabia has requested additional offensive equipment for its F-15 aircraft such as conformal fuel pods, multiple ejection bomb racks, KC 135 jet tankers, AIM-9-L super-Sidewinder missiles and AWACS. Would you support such sales? Do you support a speed-up in the delivery of the aircraft themselves? President-elect Reagan pledged his administration "will not continue to ship massive quantities of sophisticated armaments to so-called 'moderate' Arab states who, in fact, might directly threaten Israel's existence." In light of the fact that Israel has said this offensive enhancement for the Saudi F-15s poses a direct threat to its security, and in light of the President-elect's statements, would you support sale of the equipment the Saudis are seeking?

Answer. The entire question of arms sales to the Middle East is, as you know, one of the most complicated and delicate questions facing this administration. I understand the defense requirements and concerns of the countries in the area. However, at this early date I am not prepared to respond to the specific requests of Saudi Arabia or any other country in the area. Again, this is a top priority matter which I plan to concentrate on as soon as I assume office.

Senator LEVIN. In your view, what role does Israel have in U.S. defense planning to protect American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf?

Answer. Israel's role in the defense of the region is that which we would expect from any good and strong friend, but a friend that realizes the historically derived sensitivities of its neighbors. The role that I speak of is one in which the Israelis assist the United States in focusing on the real threat to the region—the radical movements and the Soviet Union—while being willing to negotiate in a spirit of compromise with moderate neighbors, and build a strong military in a manner that does not frighten their neighbors.

Senator LEVIN. In 1969, the United States accepted as a planning assumption that it would prepare its conventional forces to fight, simultaneously in conjunction with allies, one major and one minor military contingency. Does the United States have such a capability today? If not, what are the major deficiencies? Is it sufficient that the United States be prepared to fight "one and one-half" wars, or are additional capabilities called for? Do you believe that the concept underlying the RDF—that of deploying a major force overseas directly from the United States as an alternative to overseas troop deployments and military bases—is a practically valid concept? What do you see as the mission of the RDF? To protect friendly governments from insurgencies or interventions by other Third World states? To deter intervention by the Soviet Union? Is the former politically feasible, in terms of either U.S. domestic or international politics? Is the latter militarily feasible given the weight and geographical advantages of Soviet forces in threatened regions like the Persian Gulf? Is the RDF meant to serve as a "trip wire" to invoke the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

Answer. This question goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy and military doctrine. Any definitive answer requires, of course, a long range projection of the U.S. force structure. I am currently assessing U.S. capabilities worldwide. There is no question that the United States and the free world face threats in regions of the globe that were either non-existent or at a very low level 10-15 years ago. It is my intention to try, with the cooperation of the Congress, to

bring U.S. force levels and readiness to the point where, in cooperation with our allies, these threats can be met and neutralized.

Senator LEVIN. As author of the "Levin Amendment" in last year's fiscal 1981 Defense Authorization regarding the need for our allies in NATO and Japan to do more for the common defense effort, I am interested in your perspective on this matter. What can and will you do, as the new SecDef, to urge/encourage/press our allies in NATO/Japan to do more for our mutual defense, especially re: increased defense spending? When will you begin these efforts?

Answer. Equitable burdensharing within NATO is of vital importance both to the United States and to the Alliance. It is equally important for our relationship with Japan.

I share fully the Congress' concern that the burden of NATO and the defense of Northeast Asia should be distributed equitably among the allies. Accordingly, I intend to give the burdensharing issue priority attention and, wherever appropriate, to press our allies for additional contributions—both in their national defense efforts and in measures that support our own—to insure that our common defense is shared as fairly as possible.

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with the Levin amendment? What has DOD done since its passage to comply with its requirements? What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the Amendment and its requirements, and how might it be improved in the fiscal year 1982 DOD Authorization to assist you and the Congress to more effectively impress upon our Allies the need to do more for our common defense?

Answer. As I already have indicated, I support fully the sense of Congress that the burdens of mutual defense should be shared equitably by the United States and its NATO allies and with Japan. I understand that in the months since the amendment became law the United States has redoubled its efforts to secure increased allied defense spending, to increase the size of the current NATO Infrastructure program—one of the most visible (and, for the United States, most favorable) burdensharing arrangements in NATO and to secure broadened host nation support for U.S. reinforcing units from five or our key European allies. While I will review all of these initiatives and will try to improve and to broaden them, where appropriate, they appear to be just those types of things Congress had in mind when it called for more equitable burdensharing.

You will understand that I must withhold judgment on the strengths and weaknesses of the Levin Amendment until I have had an opportunity to review the report on allied commitments now being prepared. I am hopeful, however, that the report can put into perspective the complex and highly subjective business of assessing relative defense contributions, and give all of us a better understanding of how the balance is being shared and where it should be made more equitable.

Senator LEVIN. How else might this committee, the rest of Congress and the new administration work together to convince our Allies of our seriousness in these matters of "burdensharing"?

Answer. It is too early for me to respond definitively on this point. There should be no doubt in allied minds, however, that both the new Administration and the Congress are determined that our allies carry their full share of the common defense responsibility. You have signaled this point in the Amendment (Sec. 1006) to the 1981 Defense Authorization Act. My colleagues and I will be pressing for greater equity in allied defense efforts as we seek to make our mutual defense arrangements with NATO and Japan stronger and more effective.

LINKAGE, ESPECIALLY WITH ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS

Senator LEVIN. Do you agree that there should be "linkage" between all the activities, treaties, agreements, etc., we carry on with the Soviets and their "good behavior" in other matters throughout the world—even if maintenance of whatever particular activity, agreement, etc., is in the U.S. best interests regardless of what else the Soviets are doing elsewhere?

Answer. I agree that there should be linkage between the activities that occur between the United States and the U.S.S.R., including various treaties, agreements and so forth, and the good behavior which the Soviets either fail to exhibit or do exhibit in the world. I think that we might look at this problem in the context that we must also be sure that we do not allow reverse linkage to be used

against us, e.g. that the vast sums that the Soviets owe to the United States for loans that we made to help them import Western technology are not used as a way to keep the United States from undertaking military and political actions to protect our allies or our own interests overseas. So, linkage can be used as a weapon to modify Soviet behavior, and of course, the Soviets will attempt to use linkage to modify our behavior.

Senator LEVIN. During his recent discussions in the Soviet Union, our colleague, Senator Charles Percy, incoming Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reportedly told Soviet leaders that, as an effort to continue the dialogue between our two nations on arms control matters, he would consider early Committee action on Senate ratification of two arms limitation treaties signed by both nations in 1976—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Would you recommend that the Senate not consider ratification of these two treaties, in contradiction to Senator Percy, as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan and threaten intervention in Poland? Why or why not?

ANSWER. Your question as to whether we should do this as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan and threaten intervention in Poland is one which poses a very difficult dilemma. We should first take a look at both of these treaties, review them for their effect on our military capability, and determine whether they are verifiable before we begin to deal with the treaties in the context of linkage vis-a-vis Afghanistan. If the treaties are in our best interest, if they are verifiable, and if the Soviets are forthcoming on confidence building measures, we might wish to consider proceeding with one or both of the treaties. If the treaties are marginal, and do not meet these tests, then certainly we would probably not wish to ratify the treaties at this time; we should see what the Soviets do vis-a-vis Poland and Afghanistan and have an opportunity to see what they do in other areas.

Senator LEVIN. What role, if any, do you see arms control efforts playing in the defense policy and budget process and in maintaining our national security?

ANSWER. Arms control efforts are an essential part of defense policy and the budget process and represent a significant element in maintaining our overall national security. We should try to proceed with arms control limitations where we can obtain fair, verifiable agreements and where we witness compliance with treaties that we have made. If arms control efforts prevent the building of the instruments of power we need, if arms control efforts undermine the trust and confidence that we have in our allies and they have in us, if they slow down military improvements and are used as an excuse to go slow regarding the essential building of our military power, then I would say no, we should not engage in any arms control agreements of that sort.

So, in effect, we should not undertake to have arms controls in areas where we could be, or are, superior to the Soviets without engaging in meaningful arms control in areas where the Soviets are superior. Otherwise, this would, in effect, let them use arms control to blunt our comparative strengths without blunting theirs. The Soviets will be stronger in some military areas; therefore, we need to be stronger in certain other military areas.

Senator LEVIN. Which specific arms control efforts should we continue, alter or abandon: ABM treaty; Chemical weapons talks; MBFR in Europe; SALT; ASAT; CTB? Why? Would you recommend to the President that we not continue in any of these which involve ongoing negotiations until the Soviet troops are out of Afghanistan or no longer threaten intervention in Poland? Why or why not?

ANSWER. The specific arms control efforts which you mentioned, the ABM treaty, the chemical weapons talks, MBFR in Europe, SALT, the Anti-Satellite talks, and the Comprehensive Test Ban are all treaties or initiatives which should be reviewed very carefully. Each is unique, each has its potentials and its pitfalls. I will work closely with the President and the Secretary of State to assess areas where agreements are possible and build our capabilities in areas where talks are being used as a barrier to improving our military capabilities and are nothing but an international propaganda effort by the Soviets.

IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY OF NATO EUROPE TO UNITED STATES

Senator LEVIN. Since the end of World War II, the cornerstone of our defense policy has been the judgment that Western Europe is the area of the world most important to our national security—politically, economically, culturally and militarily. Do you agree that this remains true in 1981?

ANSWER. Generally, this remains true.

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Senator LEVIN. What do you perceive as our major strengths and weaknesses in the following military areas, and what do you intend to do to address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths: (a) command, control and communications (C³)—strategic and tactical, (b) conventional forces, (c) personnel, (d) sustainability, and (e) airlift?

ANSWER. (a) Command, Control and Communications. We have major strengths in the robustness of our command and control capability stemming from our ability to rapidly decentralize control, counting on the initiatives of lower level commanders, and in the high quality of our technology in the communications area. We must continue to improve upon this strength and strengthen those areas which are weak.

(b) Our tactical air forces will, I believe, hold their own against any enemy. However, our naval forces need attention now. Our ground forces, Active as well as Reserves and National Guard, are in need of major attention. Readiness is not up to a proper standard. The rate of modernization of our forces must be maintained and even increased so as to reestablish, in critical areas, both technological and operational advantages over our major opponents.

(c) Personnel. In the personnel area we have major strengths in the quality of our officer corps and among longer-serving noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel. The recent rapid loss of experienced and skilled service members, due, among other things, to inadequate compensation, is a major problem. We intend to give priority to actions that will help attract and retain the capable, dedicated people we require.

(d) Sustainability. This is a major problem area that needs increased attention. Stocks of major end items, munitions, fuel, spare parts and other expendables are too low. Our industrial base, on which the responsive mobilization production of ammunition, weapons, equipment and supplies depends, needs to be revived.

(e) Airlift. The airlift category reveals technological strength and high skill levels among our forces, but a shortfall in the size and number of required airframes. This requirement needs to be seen in the context of increasing Soviet capabilities to project their forces and military power into areas such as the Middle East and elsewhere, especially close to their borders. I intend to seek ways of both getting the most out of current airlift assets and increasing our airlift capability.

Senator LEVIN. With the new administration committed to fighting inflation, and based on your own experience as former OMB director and your other broad economic experiences, why won't such large increases in defense spending as are being discussed, for now and fiscal year 1982, be inflationary, even if partially offset by cuts in domestic programs?

ANSWER. Research from leading economic forecasting organizations indicates that defense creates no more inflation than transfer payments that go to individuals. In fact, a strong case can be made that defense spending probably creates less inflation than transfer payments. I believe the question really is whether or not we're going to have an overall balanced budget, and we do need to have a balanced budget, but we need to do that after spending what is necessary to reverse America's military decline and assure our national security.

MILITARY PERSONNEL; ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE; COMPENSATION

Senator LEVIN. In the past you have been characterized as a strong defender of the All Volunteer Force concept. Do you still agree that we can best meet our defense needs with an all volunteer force as compared with a force based on the draft? Why or why not?

ANSWER. I support the All Volunteer Force concept. However, if this concept cannot produce the required effective forces, I am prepared to consider other alternatives.

Senator LEVIN. Due to a decline in the U.S. birth rate that began in the early 1960s, significantly fewer men will be coming of age for military services in the early 1980s. This could put severe new strains on the already difficult recruitment problems faced by the all-volunteer army. Your predecessor, Secretary Brown, stated in mid-December of last year that a return to conscription might be necessary for this reason. Under what circumstances would you support return to

a peacetime draft? Since a major criticism of the old draft was that it was unfair, what might you propose to make any new system more equitable? Looking at the proportional representation of minorities in the combat branches of the all-volunteer force, can you say that the present volunteer system is any more equitable than the old one? Would you favor drafting women? What is your overall assessment of the performance of the volunteer system for recruiting for military service? Are pay increases the answer to difficulties confronting the present system?

ANSWER. The answer to this very complicated and important issue is not yet formulated in my own mind. I plan to devote much of my time to this very dynamic problem. For instance, the recent pay raise has improved retention and recruitment, but we are not sure yet what other impacts it may have on the all-volunteer force, particularly as to quality.

Senator LEVIN. Considering the many billions of dollars Congress has just added to military compensation and benefits, would it not be wiser to determine what effects, if any, these increases have on recruitment, retention, and quality of military personnel before we add any more money in the form of a further pay raise across the board or even more expanded benefits, bonuses, etc.? Why or why not?

ANSWER. Despite the substantial increases in military compensation recently provided by Congress, we cannot assume that the pay problems are solved. As I mentioned in my response to the previous question, I plan to give priority attention to the matter of military compensation and I will be making my recommendations to the Congress as soon as possible.

Senator LEVIN. As a member of President-elect Reagan's budget task force, you recently were quoted as saying: "There is fraud, waste and mismanagement everywhere, and that includes defense. Nothing can be untouchable, nothing sacred." I applaud this view. What specific areas of fraud, waste and mismanagement do you think currently exist in DOD and the rest of the defense establishment, and how do you intend to correct them?

ANSWER. As I have already testified, we want to make sure that we do not spend unnecessarily or wastefully. We want to enhance readiness by effective application of resources, and I intend to begin by looking into several areas of systems development and procurement for potential cost cuts.

Senator LEVIN. Every incoming administration vows to be more efficient in its defense spending and to avoid wasting scarce defense dollars. With the large increases in defense spending currently being discussed, it is even more important to avoid wasting taxpayer dollars, since this is exactly the environment of "largesse" in which the possibilities of waste are greatest. How do you intend to reduce the possibilities of such waste? What specific management, program and budget actions will you take to accomplish this?

ANSWER. I believe that my previous experience at HEW, OMB and in California can be applied effectively at Defense. This area, as I indicated in the previous answer, will be one of my highest priorities.

Senator LEVIN. The Reagan administration appears to be committed to substantial increases in expenditures for military hardware. There is evidence to suggest, however, that at least some of the American military's hardware deficiencies can be attributed less to inadequate funding than to a research and development strategy that stresses state-of-the-art technical proficiency over timely deployment of new weapons systems, holding down unit cost, and improving battle-field reliability. Is it your view that such a problem exists? If so, can "throwing more money at the problem" solve it? What can be done to reform a system that appears to be institutionally committed to producing fewer and fewer, more sophisticated, but less reliable weapons at even greater cost?

ANSWER. At this point, I am not necessarily convinced such a problem exists. But if it does, I will take steps to strike a balance between sophistication and readiness with emphasis on the latter.

Senator LEVIN. It almost has become liturgy that we should reverse the trend toward overly complex and sophisticated weapons systems which are unreliable, require more maintenance and are so expensive that we cannot purchase enough of them to meet military needs. Specifically, how do you intend to reverse this trend? What do you think should be done to do so in terms of management, programing, budgeting or policy changes? (If you cannot be specific now how do you intend to find out what should be done, and by when will you be able to inform us of this?)

ANSWER. As stated previously I do believe that we need to strike a proper balance between high technology and operability.

Senator LEVIN. It is estimated that \$17 billion exist as unobligated budget authority in the several defense agencies. This is spending authority derived from prior appropriation bills. This spending authority has accumulated over years from expired appropriations accounts. The growth of this spending authority in recent years raises questions about procurement procedures and accounting practices both in and outside the Defense Department. In a recent assignment, GAO was unable to determine the merged surplus authority (the bulk of which is unobligated balances) for the Defense Department due to the absence of adequate records. In fact, no records are presently being maintained in Treasury Department control accounts for the merged surplus authority. Since this spending authority can be tapped for the purchase of goods and services and there are indications that this spending authority has been abused, I think it offers an important source for savings and management improvements.

ANSWER. While I am not presently familiar with the status of Defense obligations, I will make sure that we take every measure to be as efficient as possible.

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with the growth and nature of unobligated balances, and if so, do you agree that efforts are necessary to limit and control the use of merged surplus authority?

ANSWER. Again while not familiar with the details, I will take whatever action necessary to make the best use of defense dollars.

Senator LEVIN. What changes in procurement and appropriation procedures are required to insure the efficient use of unobligated balances? Will you be willing to work with members of this Committee in exploring ways to improve the operation of unobligated balances in the Defense Department?

ANSWER. After examining our weapons systems acquisition process, I will work with the Congress in trying to insure that unobligated balances are not excessive.

Senator LEVIN. Do you intend to quickly implement the modified Maybank provisions in the fiscal year 1981 DOD Appropriations Act providing for the targeting of \$3.4 billion in nonstrategic military expenditures in labor surplus areas in the nation? How do you intend to implement these modified Maybank provisions? The modifications to the Maybank provisions in the fiscal year 1981 DOD appropriations Act are widely viewed as an important first-step in recognizing the positive impact defense procurement can have in helping to deal with high unemployment. What steps will you take to strengthen this program in your DOD budget recommendations for fiscal year 1982?

ANSWER. Naturally, I will fulfill the responsibilities placed upon me by the Congress. With respect to specific steps I will need time to study various alternatives and consult with other members of the Administration.

Senator LEVIN. On what do you base your statement that this nation needs a 600-ship Navy? Have you discussed this force level goal with the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Hayward?

ANSWER. My assessment of the need for a 600-ship Navy is based upon the increasing Soviet threat. After I take office, I will consult with the Chief of Naval Operations and other members of the JCS on all our force level decisions.

Senator LEVIN. How would you propose we structure this Navy—with more large deck carriers with super complex aircraft and super expensive escorts—or more smaller, less vulnerable carriers, air capable ships with V/STOL aircraft and fewer escort requirements.

ANSWER. At this point, I am not prepared to make recommendations concerning specific kinds and combinations of ships. We will seek to build a Navy that can carry out the missions of sea control and power projection equally.

Senator LEVIN. With continuing schedule, cost, quality problems in one of our shipyards—Electric Boat—regarding acceptable building rates for attack and missile submarines—won't this affect our ability to reach a 600-ship Navy? How will you address this problem?

ANSWER. I recognize that problems exist in this area. If confirmed, I will see to it that my office works closely with the Navy and industry in an effort to overcome these difficulties in achieving our shipbuilding objectives.

Senator LEVIN. How are we going to man a 600-ship Navy when we can't adequately man the 500-ship Navy we have now?

ANSWER. I am hopeful that improved pay and benefits of all types will go far towards redressing our retention and recruiting shortfalls.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Weinberger, do you believe that our Foreign Military Sales program is beneficial to our national security? What impact do you believe the program has on the readiness of our conventional forces. What should be DOD's role in making foreign military sales policy?

ANSWER. Yes, foreign military sales can in many instances enhance our own national security. Unless we have an adequate production level, foreign sales can decrease our own force levels I believe that DOD should have a major role in the formation of foreign military sales policy.

Senator LEVIN. Since the end of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the force readiness accounts of the defense budget (military pay and O&M) have been cut routinely by Congress and the executive branch in favor of force modernization (procurement and research and development). In recent years, pressures on military pay and the O&M account have increased dramatically: Sophisticated new weapons systems have proved to be expensive to operate, personnel recruitment has assumed a higher priority, and the funding of a number of programs has been transferred to O&M. A central issue in the preparation of future defense budget requests will be to strike balance between funding force modernization and force readiness. Where will the Reagan administration place its emphasis in striking a balance between the two? What specific measures do you intend to support to improve force readiness? Will these initiatives mean some sacrifice in force modernization? If so, in what areas? How will you deal with the essentially political problem that there is no "constituency" for "unglamorous" force readiness programs?

ANSWER. The Reagan administration will balance readiness and force modernization demands since both contribute to military capability. Neither one should be sacrificed for the other. Force readiness can be improved by such measures as increasing spare parts procurement, better training, and the retention of skilled people. Modernization efforts can be made to pay off by flexible and innovative design, development, and procurement practices. I will be the "constituency" for "unglamorous" force readiness programs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Senator BYRD. Mr. Weinberger, in your testimony to the Armed Services Committee you have stated that you "would like to see if the voluntary armed services will work with increased pay and benefits." I would like to know what magnitude of pay and benefit increases you intend, and secondly, what the resulting retirement costs will be. Specifically, what do you estimate the total cost of retirement pensions and benefits will be in 1985, 1990 and 2000?

ANSWER. I cannot see how we can maintain a viable AVF if we allow pay and benefits to erode. The budgetary impact of restoring and maintaining comparability will mean that military personnel costs will increase substantially, but it is not possible now to set our specific budget totals several years out.

Senator BYRD. Is there a level of costs at which the voluntary armed forces become too expensive? In your judgement will it be necessary to increase pay benefits, and consequently retirement costs, indefinitely, or is there a cutoff point at which such expenses will be too great? How do you plan to determine that point? What alternatives are you considering for maintaining adequate military manpower if the voluntary armed services simply becomes too costly?

ANSWER. I am sure there is a level of costs at which the All Volunteer Force (AVF) becomes too expensive, but we are not at that level yet when we are spending a bit over 5 percent of our GNP on defense. In 1964, prior to the Vietnam buildup, we were spending over 8 percent of our GNP on defense. There is, however, a point at which personnel costs could become too great, and at that point we will have to consider a variety of mechanisms to reduce the portion of defense spending that is allocated to personnel. It is very difficult to predict that point. With inadequate funds we can have either a force that is too small, unprepared, or obsolete. Unless there is adequate overall funding, something must suffer.

I support the All Volunteer Force concept, because I believe that government should intrude in the lives of its citizens to the least extent possible. On the other hand, I believe that each citizen owes a duty to his nation, and that an

explicit manifestation of that—such as service in the military—could be desirable. On balance, in peacetime I prefer that service in the military be voluntary. This presumes, of course, that an AVF produces the right kinds of people to man and operate the complex modern equipment that we have today. If the AVF cannot provide for a lean, fighting force, then I am prepared to look for other means to accomplish that need.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BUDGET AND PERSONNEL

Senator PROXMIRE. What amendments to the fiscal year 1981 budget do you propose sending to the Congress and what will be the total effect on that budget in budget authority and outlays?

ANSWER. Any amendments which we submit to the fiscal year 1981 budget will support primarily unanticipated changes in inflation rates and operating tempo. The total dollar effect therefore is uncertain this time.

Senator PROXMIRE. Will there be any new starts authorized in your budget amendments?

ANSWER. Until I have analyzed the situation completely, I cannot be certain about whether there will be any new programs started in fiscal year 1981. My inclination is to reserve any needed major program initiatives as amendments to the fiscal year 1982 budget.

Senator PROXMIRE. What is your long term outlook for the defense budget in constant dollars and by real growth rate compared to the base year 1980?

ANSWER. As I noted previously, I do not wish to describe our defense needs in terms of fixed percentages. However, at this time, it seems clear to me that defense spending will need to rise considerably in constant dollars compared to base year fiscal 1980.

Senator PROXMIRE. Do you expect to make any substantial revisions in the military personnel force levels of the fiscal year 1981 budget? If so, in what areas?

ANSWER. No substantial revisions are contemplated in active duty military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1981. My major emphasis in the area of personnel will be to retain adequate numbers of qualified noncommissioned and petty officers.

Senator PROXMIRE. With nearly one million civilians employed by the Department of Defense, do you expect to find economies by reducing this category and if so by what amount over what period of time?

ANSWER. Until I review the impact of civilian end strength and pay levels on readiness, I cannot be certain about the number of civilians needed by the Department.

Senator PROXMIRE. To what extent can the number of DoD civilians be reduced by increased attention to "contracting out?"

ANSWER. I think that there are areas where the need for civilians can be reduced by contracting out. Where this practice can save funds without impairing readiness, I will not hesitate to employ it.

Senator PROXMIRE. How much has "grade creep" contributed to the payroll of the DoD civilian population since 1964—the last pre-Vietnam war year?

ANSWER. If the average civilian grade in DoD were at the level of 1964, the civilian payroll for fiscal year 1981 would be less than it is. There has been grade creep, and I will look into its costs.

Senator PROXMIRE. Please project U.S. defense spending by year over the next 5 years under the assumption of an 8 to 9 percent growth rate for 2 years, followed by a leveling off to a 5 percent rate of increase.

ANSWER. These are your assumptions—not mine. But if defense spending rises by 8 percent in real terms over the next 2 years and then increases by 5 percent per year over the next term, the fiscal year 1981–85 outlay profile program will be as follows:

	Fiscal year					
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Constant fiscal year 1980 dollars	158.0	170.6	184.2	193.4	203.1	213.3
Real growth (percent)		.08	.08	.05	.05	.05
Inflation (percent)	100.00	111.77	122.34	133.44	144.15	154.71
Current dollars	158.0	190.7	225.4	258.1	292.8	330.0

Senator PROXMIRE. Should military pay be made inflation proof by constant dollar increases every year? Should military pay be increased to compensate for any decline in purchasing power calculated since the early 1970s? If the answer to either of the two previous questions was yes, please document the budgetary impact this will have in fiscal year 1982 and beyond.

ANSWER. I believe that the purchasing power of military people should be improved and maintained. I cannot see how we can maintain a viable AVF if we allow pay and benefits to erode.

PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES

Senator PROXMIRE. Does the Administration plan to open a strategic bomber production line and if so what are the total program costs associated with this proposal?

ANSWER. The Reagan Administration comes into office with a deep concern about the imbalance in the strategic force postures of the United States and the USSR. There are a variety of steps—operational, doctrinal, and developmental—that we must take to quickly but efficiently restore the strategic balance. The decision about any new bomber, and the variants of it, will be taken within this overall context.

Based upon the evidence that I have to date, the administration would be inclined to pursue development of a strategic bomber after a thorough but rapid engineering development effort. The total program costs of such a program would, of course, depend on the number, schedule and sophistication of such a bomber.

Senator PROXMIRE. Is it your intent to endorse a goal of a 600 ship Navy and if so, what shipbuilding rates would have to be achieved to produce this goal?

ANSWER. We clearly need to build up our fleet in the face of a challenge for maritime superiority by the USSR; this will probably require that we move in the direction of a 600 ship Navy. However, we may decide to have more or fewer ships depending on such variables as the sophistication and multi-mission capabilities of the ships that we build and the degree to which we use Navy land-based aircraft for certain missions.

If we were to build up to a 600 ship Navy by the mid-90s, we would need to construct 25 to 30 ships a year and extend the lives of some of our current ships through high quality Service Life Extension Programs.

Senator PROXMIRE. To what extent do you propose to accelerate ABM defenses for the MX deployment and at what point will it be necessary to consider amending the ABM Treaty to permit a mobile ABM defense system?

ANSWER. I believe that we must look very carefully at ABM technology. An effective ABM system may be needed in the event that the Soviets increase substantially the number of their hard target kill capable warheads. If we were to achieve a significant breakthrough in the ABM area, we might—after extensive study—be able to deploy MX in fixed silos protected by ABM.

Senator PROXMIRE. Does the administration plan to accelerate space based laser-developments and to what degree would a successful development program by necessity breach the ABM Treaty of the Outer Space Treaty?

ANSWER. I intend to place a high priority on the development of new technologies for weapons systems, including lasers. We must utilize our technology advantages in order to offset Soviet advantages in other areas.

Senator PROXMIRE. Do you support the All Volunteer Force concept?

ANSWER. I support the All Volunteer Force concept, because I believe that government should intrude in the lives of its citizens to the least extent possible. On the other hand, I believe that each citizen owes a duty to his nation, and that an explicit manifestation of that—such as service in the military—could be desirable. On balance, in peacetime I prefer that service in the military be voluntary. This presumes, of course, that an AVF produces the right kinds of people to man and operate the complex modern equipment that we have today.

Senator PROXMIRE. What indicators would provide you with proof that the All Volunteer Force is not working?

ANSWER. The indicators that I would use would be both objective and subjective, in the category of objective indicators, I would look at such input factors as the shortfall in meeting recruitment goals, the number of high school graduates, and the percentages of recruits in various mental categories, and such output factors as the percentage fill in critical military occupational specialties and the performance of units in operational readiness tests, command maintenance inspections, and training tests. The subjective factors would be such things as the attitudes and morale of everyone from the privates through officers.

Senator PROXMIRE. Is it your intent to recommend that the Congress fund additional nuclear aircraft carriers and if so, how many over what time period and at what cost.

ANSWER. It is my intent to recommend to the Congress that our Navy be built up and improved in quality. I will be getting into this matter soon and be prepared to forward a revised 5-year shipbuilding plan to the Congress as part of the proposed Amendments to the fiscal year 1982 DOD Authorization bill.

Senator PROXMIRE. The Senate Armed Services Committee has recommended that the number of generals and admirals be reduced. Do you share that conclusion?

ANSWER. I have not yet reached a decision on this matter. I will make it a matter of priority in my examination of the leadership needs of the Department of Defense.

Senator PROXMIRE. What regulations do you propose to eliminate or curtail which would increase the efficiency of the Department of Defense? Can you provide the Committee with a timetable for curtailing or eliminating regulations?

ANSWER. At this time, I do not have a specific list of regulations that I propose to eliminate or curtail. I will have a task force begin work in this area, and we will make a systematic review of all the various regulations. Much of what I hope to do in this area is in the area of contracting and acquisition policy. I have heard a great deal about the virtues and cost savings that could be achieved from multi-year contracting. I will personally lead the crusade to make the Pentagon and the operation and support forces more efficient, but not at the expense of cutting real combat capability.

Senator PROXMIRE. What specific paperwork burdens at the Department of Defense do you propose to eliminate in the first 6 months of your tenure at the Department of Defense? In what ways can a reduction of paperwork contribute to greater efficiency?

ANSWER. You will appreciate that I have not yet had time to examine this area of concern. But I can assure you that this is a matter of concern to me, and I will give it priority attention in the near future.

Chairman Tower. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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